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Introduction 
This report is from a study of the suspended sentence power in Hong Kong undertaken by the 
Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the request of the Law Society of Hong Kong 
(LSHK).  Members of the LSHK’s Criminal Law and Procedure Committee have been 
concerned about the list of exceptions to the suspended sentence power.  The purpose of this 
report is to inform members of that Committee of the background and law on the suspended 
sentence power and to aid their ongoing discussion of the topic with the Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong.  The study focuses specifically on the exceptions to the power of 
the courts of Hong Kong to impose suspended sentences under the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance (Cap 221) (CPO).  The study will consider arguments for maintaining, abolishing 
or reforming the list of excepted offences for which offenders cannot receive a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment regardless of circumstances.  In doing so, the project will examine 
the nature of judicial power to order suspended sentences or their equivalent in the following 
jurisdictions: Australia (Victoria), New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, and the United 
Kingdom (UK).  It will also provide the historical context in which Hong Kong introduced 
the suspended sentence of imprisonment, and the rationale for excepting the offences listed in 
Schedule 3 of the CPO.  
 In summary, the study concludes that there are substantial reasons for eliminating the 
list of exceptions altogether or at least removing those offences that do not invariably cause 
serious physical violence to others.  The points that support this position include the 
following: 
1. The original rationale for having exceptions no longer applies.  Hong Kong is now a 
much safer place than before and the prevalence of violent offences has decreased 
significantly since the 1970s. 
2. Some of the excepted offences, such as attempted indecent assault and the weapons 
related offences, can occur in a wide range of circumstances, including exceptional 
circumstances (e.g. offence occurring without circumstances of aggravation, first-time 
remorseful offender with little risk of re-offending) which would ordinarily justify a 
suspended sentence. Imprisoning such offenders for lack of a better sentencing 
alternative is an injustice. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655623 
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3. The exceptions restrict sentencing discretion and impair the court’s ability to do 
justice in individual cases.  Removing such constraints on discretion is consistent with 
human rights norms against disproportionate and arbitrary imprisonment. 
4. There is no reason to believe that repealing the exceptions will lead to either more 
offending or an increased risk of harm to the community.  Suspension will continue to 
be reserved for only exceptional cases.  Hong Kong courts can be trusted to continue 
to imprison offenders who pose a substantial risk to the community. 
5. The list of excepted offences is not comprehensive.  Other violent and serious 
offences have been left out.  This means those convicted of such offences, in theory, 
can be entitled to a suspended sentence of imprisonment.  This illogicality can give 
rise to a general sense of unfairness and arbitrariness. 
6. None of the overseas jurisdictions reviewed has as wide a list of exceptions to 
suspended or community sentences powers.  If exceptions exist, they are normally 
confined to offences of serious violence. 
Suspended Sentences: An Overview 
The suspended sentence of imprisonment is often described as the ‘Sword of Damocles’, 
hanging over the offender as an effective deterrent while avoiding the human and financial 
costs of imprisonment.  Since its first appearance in France in the late 19
th
 century, it has 
been adopted in various common law jurisdictions, primarily as a rehabilitative option to 
keep first or minor offenders out of prison.
2
  Australia was at the forefront of enacting 
provisions for suspended sentences, with Victoria introducing them as early as 1915.
3
  They 
were first introduced in the UK in 1967, but did not find favour with Canadian lawmakers 
until 1995.
4
  Common to each of these jurisdictions, however, is the chequered history of the 
application, breadth, and degrees and levels of conditionality of such sentences since their 
inception.  
                                                 
2
 Don Weatherburn and Lorana Bartels, “The Recidivism of Offenders Given Suspended Sentences in New 
South Wales, Australia” (2008) 48 British Journal of Criminology 667. 
3
 Sentencing Advisory Council, Suspended Sentences Final Report Part 1 (2006). 
4
 Bill C-41, now S.C. 1995 c. 22 proclaimed in force on 3 September 1996. 
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Suspended sentencing as an option available to the courts of these jurisdictions has 
been modified either by way of reduction, abolition, modification and in rare instances 
expansion, over the course of time, and it is generally the case that in the jurisdictions which 
democratically elect their representatives, clear shifts in penal policy can be associated with 
reformist governments and their quest to appear more responsive to public opinion.
5
  Political 
platforms often seize on public perceptions of crime, in particular where cases arise which 
provoke public outcry.
6
  
Hong Kong 
Introduction of suspended sentencing power in Hong Kong 
The introduction of suspended sentences in Hong Kong came as a result of the Criminal 
Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1971 (the Bill).  This piece of legislature was itself an effort to 
locally legislate such parts of the UK Criminal Law Act 1967 and the Criminal Justice Act 
1967 as thought to be appropriate to the needs of Hong Kong.
7
 
Clause 11 of the Bill proposed the introduction of seven new sections dealing with 
suspended sentences of imprisonment, ultimately enacted as sections 109B-109H of the 
CPO.
8
  Section 109B
9
 provides that a court which passes a sentence of imprisonment of not 
                                                 
5
 Arie Freiberg, “The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council: Incorporating Community Views into the 
Sentencing Process” in Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds), Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and 
Sentencing Policy (Sydney: Hawkins Press, 2008) 148. 
6
 For example, in Australia, the case of Director of Public Prosecution v Sims [2004] VSCA 129, where a young 
man convicted of two counts of lingual and digital rape, one count of indecent assault and one count of 
aggravated burglary was given a sentence of two years’ and nine months imprisonment suspended for three 
years. The sentence was upheld on appeal by a 2-1 majority. In an example from Canada, R v Rego, 2010 ONSC 
2937, an employee who committed a serious breach of trust by planning and initiating an offence against his 
employer had his ‘conditional’ (i.e. suspended) sentence overturned by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on 
the grounds that the aggravating factors seriously outweighed the mitigating factors, and thus the court saw fit to 
impose a fit and proper sentence to meet the necessary deterrence and denunciation required by the nature of the 
offence.  
7
 Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2 December 1970, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1971, second 
reading. Available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h701202.pdf. 
8
 Section 109H (repealed 74 of 1976 s. 2) provided that sections of the 1971 Amendment Bill which dealt with 
suspended sentences (109B-109G) would expire at the end of 1973 unless the Council appointed a later date by 
resolution. The section was enacted to reflect the controversy of the measure and the difficulty of assessing the 
extent to which the system would assist in prevention of crime and dealing with offenders. Council resolved in 
December of 1973 that all seven provisions (109B – 109H) be extended by an additional three years. See: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr73-74/h731212.pdf. In 1976 section 109H was repealed, and the provisions relating 
to suspended sentencing made permanent.  
(See http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr76-77/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h761208.pdf)  
9
 Section 109B in full provides as follows: 
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more than two years may (unless a probation order is made on the same occasion in respect 
of another offence), order that the sentence shall not take effect unless, during a period 
specified in the order, which must not be less than one year or more than three years from the 
date of the order, the offender commits another offence punishable with imprisonment.
10
  On 
passing a suspended sentence, the court may impose such conditions as it thinks fits and must 
explain to the offender “in ordinary language” his liability if during the operational period he 
commits an offence punishable with imprisonment or breaks any condition imposed.
11
   
By section 109C, the courts are empowered to order suspended sentences to take 
effect where during the operational period of a suspended sentence an offender is either 
convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment or in breach of a condition imposed.    
The norm is for the suspended sentence to take effect with the original term unaltered “unless 
the court is of opinion that it would be unjust to do so in view of all the circumstances which 
have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed, including the facts of the subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1) A court which passes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than 2 years for an offence, 
other than an excepted offence, may order that the sentence shall not take effect unless, during a period 
specified in the order, being not less than 1 year nor more than 3 years from the date of the order, the 
offender commits in Hong Kong another offence punishable with imprisonment and thereafter a court 
having power to do so orders under section 109C that the original sentence shall take effect. (Amended 
39 of 1999 s.3)  
(2) A court which passes a suspended sentence on any person for an offence shall not make a probation 
order in his case in respect of another offence of which he is convicted by or before the court or for 
which he is dealt with by the court. 
(3) On passing a suspended sentence the court-  
(a) may impose such conditions as it thinks fit; 
(b) shall explain to the offender in ordinary language his liability under section 109C if during 
the operational period he commits an offence punishable with imprisonment or breaks any 
condition imposed under paragraph (a). 
(4) If a court has passed a suspended sentence on any person, and that person is subsequently sentenced 
to detention in a training centre, he shall cease to be liable to be dealt with in respect of the suspended 
sentence unless the subsequent sentence or any conviction or finding on which it was passed is quashed 
on appeal. 
 (5) Subject to any provision to the contrary contained in this or any other Ordinance-  
(a) a suspended sentence which has not taken effect under section 109C shall be treated as a 
sentence of imprisonment for the purposes of all Ordinances except any Ordinance which 
provides for disqualification for or loss of office, or forfeiture of pensions, of persons 
sentenced to imprisonment; and 
(b) where a suspended sentence has taken effect under section 109C, the offender shall be 
treated for the purposes of the said excepted Ordinances as having been convicted on the 
ordinary date on which the period allowed for making an appeal against an order under 
section 109C expires or, if such an appeal is made, the date on which it is finally disposed of 
or abandoned or fails for non-prosecution. 
10
 “It should be made absolutely clear that if a suspended sentence of imprisonment is imposed it is a sentence 
of imprisonment, and that any offence committed during the currency of the suspension will usually result in 
that sentence being served”, per Silke VP, Attorney General v Wu Chi-sing [1989] 2 HKC 76, 79. 
11
 CPO, s. 109B(3). 
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offence”.12  Reasons must be stated if the court is of the opinion that full activation of the 
suspended sentence would be unjust.
13
  The court also has power to order that the sentence 
take effect with the substitution of a greater or lesser term for the original term, and to vary 
the original order by substituting for the operational period specified a period not later than 
three years from the date of the variation.
14
  It can also choose to make no order at all with 
respect to the suspended sentence.
15
  While these latter three options may fall short of full 
activation, none may be chosen unless full activation would be unjust in view of all the 
circumstances. 
Section 109D addresses the question of which court should deal with an accused who 
is subject to a suspended sentence.  It provides that an offender may be dealt with in respect 
of a suspended sentence by any court before which he appears or is brought, and empowers 
magistrates to activate or deal with otherwise an offender who appears before him who has 
committed an offence punishable with imprisonment during the operation period of a 
suspended sentence passed by the Court of First Instance or the District Court, except where 
it would be more convenient to be dealt with by the court which passed the suspended 
sentence.  
Sections 109E deals with the process for bringing the offender before the court to 
have his suspended sentence dealt with upon the discovery of further offences or breaches of 
condition.  Section 109F provides that an offender who breaks a condition imposed on him 
by the court which passed the suspended sentence shall be dealt with as if he had been 
convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment. 
Test to be applied by Hong Kong courts in deciding whether to suspend a sentence of 
imprisonment 
In deciding whether to suspend a sentence of imprisonment, the court should first decide 
whether any appropriate alternative to imposing a sentence of imprisonment, such as a fine or 
                                                 
12
 CPO, s. 109C(1). While it is accepted that there is a residual discretion in the magistrate not to activate 
suspended sentence, it is equally accepted, as was stated by Sir Denys Roberts CJ, in Attorney General v Wong 
Ho-ming [1988] 1 HKLR 317, 320, that in the great majority of cases, it is the duty of a court to activate a 
suspended sentence. 
13
 CPO, s. 109C(1). I Grenville Cross and Patrick WS Cheung, Sentencing in Hong Kong, 5
th
 ed (Hong Kong: 
LexisNexis, 2007): “Activation should occur ‘save in rare and exceptional circumstances’: HKSAR v Chiu Wai-
sing, Carman MA, 839/2005. If the suspended sentence is not taken seriously by the courts it will forfeit its 
credibility.” 
14
 CPO, s. 109C(1)((b) & (c). 
15
 CPO, s. 109C(1)(d). 
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probation order, is appropriate.  If the court answers this question in the negative, it should 
then determine the proper term of imprisonment.  Only after the court has determined that 
there is no appropriate alternative to imprisonment, and determined the appropriate custodial 
sentence, should the court then decide whether it is appropriate to suspend the term of 
imprisonment.   
The test normally applied by the courts when deciding to suspend a sentence of 
imprisonment is one of ‘exceptional circumstances’.16  The term has been interpreted as 
being wide enough to take account of all the relevant circumstances surrounding the offence, 
the offender and the background. The courts have endorsed a ‘holistic approach’ to 
determining whether circumstances are exceptional, noting that there may be cases where a 
single striking feature would amount to exceptional circumstance, or where, in the absence of 
a single factor, the collective impact of all the relevant circumstances would make the case 
exceptional.
17
 
The debate on second reading: Provisions distinct from UK Criminal Justice Act 1967 and 
arguments advanced in favour of the system of suspended sentences 
While the sections introduced under the 1971 Bill generally followed sections 39 to 42 of the 
UK Criminal Justice Act 1967, the Hong Kong legislation contained a number of significant 
differences, which were thought to make the provisions concerning suspended sentences 
“more suitable to our needs here in Hong Kong.”18  Under the 1967 UK Act, custodial 
sentences of six months or less were automatically suspended unless “the act or any of the 
acts constituting [the] offence consisted of an assault on or threat of violence to another 
person, or of having or possessing a firearm, an imitation firearm, an explosive or offensive 
weapon or of indecent conduct with or towards a person under the age of sixteen years”.19  
This amounted to a de facto abolition of short sentences of imprisonment, unless the 
exception applied.  But even where the exception applied or in respect of longer 
imprisonment terms of not more than two years, suspension remained at the discretion of the 
trial judge and there were no excepted offences.  Such provisions were not adopted in the 
Hong Kong Bill.   
                                                 
16
 HKSAR v Hsueh Cheng-kang, Peter, MA 135/2004. 
17
 R v Zekir Rahman [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 404, 411. 
18
 Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2 December 1970, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1971, second 
reading. Available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h701202.pdf 
19
 Criminal Justice Act 1967, s. 39(3)(a). 
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Another important difference in the Hong Kong Bill was the power of the court under 
section 109B(3)(a) to impose conditions as it thought fit upon the offender subject to the 
suspended sentence.  Examples of conditions include an order that the convicted person not 
undertake certain kinds of work, not attend specific places, or not mix with ‘undesirable 
characters’.  At the debate on second reading of the CPO (Amendment) Bill in December, 
1970, Acting Attorney General GR Sneath clarified the rationale for the addition of this 
provision by noting they were necessary to make clear to persons upon whom a suspended 
sentence has been passed that “the courts retain an interest in their behavior and the means 
for effective supervision of their activities.”20 Any breach of court-imposed conditions would 
be dealt with by the court in the same manner as if it amounted to a conviction of the accused 
of a subsequent offence during the operational period by virtue of section 109F.  
In support of the implementation of the system of suspended sentencing, the Acting 
Attorney General cited the most important argument that it would confer on a court a wider 
choice when faced with the difficult task of assessing the correct sentence for offenders 
appearing before it. Notice was given to the two major considerations a court must balance in 
exercising its sentencing powers: the extent to which the sentence must reflect the gravity of 
the offence and the question of how far the punishment should be related to the particular 
circumstances of the offender. The power to order a sentence of imprisonment and to then 
suspend it would enable the court “to pass a sentence which reflects the seriousness of the 
crime, but at the same time to exercise a measure of leniency if the individual circumstances 
of the offender appear to justify such a course.”21  
Reference was also made to the findings of the English experience during the first 
year of the operation of the suspended sentence system in England. Over 90 percent of 
individuals with suspended sentences who offended again during the operational period were 
required to serve the original sentence of imprisonment, indicating a reluctance by the courts 
to let a man off if in fact he offended again. Approximately 60 percent of offenders sentenced 
to a suspended sentence did not offend again during the operational period.  Using the 
English experience as a guide, it was also predicted that about half the cases in which the 
courts imposed suspended sentences were those in which presently a custodial sentence 
                                                 
20
 Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2 December 1970, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1971, second 
reading. Available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h701202.pdf 
21
 Ibid.  
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would be imposed, while the other half would be comprised of those where at the time a fine 
or probation was imposed.  
Turning to the issue of public confidence, it was emphasized that the public should 
not be misled into thinking a system of suspended sentencing was a weak method of dealing 
with an offender, but rather an opportunity for the courts to give “a further chance to 
offenders who appear to want it and in order to keep them out of prison, an environment 
which may turn a young man against the community and make him into a professional 
criminal.”22 
Resumption of the debate on second reading: Creation of ‘excepted offences’  
The question of the suspended sentence provisions was revisited in the resumption of the 
debate on second reading of the Bill in January 1971.  On this occasion Council members 
turned against the idea of enacting the Bill in its present form, which would make the 
sentencing option available to all manner of crimes provided the custodial sentence imposed 
was one of two years or less.  
Foremost among the concerns expressed by Council members was the sharp increase 
in violent crime, in particular as committed by young offenders, in the years immediately 
preceding the introduction of the Bill.  The Council had only recently enacted section 109A 
of the CPO (Ordinance No 66 of 1967), which provided that “no Court shall sentence a 
person of over 16 and under 21 years of age to imprisonment unless the Court is of the 
opinion that no other method of dealing with such person is appropriate.”  It was said that this 
provision was introduced “at a time when we could afford to be optimistic in view of the low 
rate of crimes of violence by young persons”,23 but that the then present crime wave required 
the Council to consider modification of the section by excluding from its operation certain 
specified crimes of violence.  It was proposed that these crimes be listed in a Schedule to the 
Ordinance, such Schedule being subject to amendment from time to time by a resolution of 
the Council without the need for the passage of a further amending bill.  
The widespread feeling of the Members of Council and members of the public 
generally was that owing to the increase in violent crime, it would be unwise to pass 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
23
Mr. Wilson Wang, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 20th January 1971, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 
1971, resumption of debate on second reading. Available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h710120.pdf  
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legislation which might appear to be advocating leniency towards violent offenders.  Council 
member and barrister Mr. Oswald Cheung went so far as to call for a withdrawal of section 
109A in addition to the rejection of Clause 11 of the Bill. It was thus in the face of strong 
legislative opposition and widespread public anxiety over the perceived growth of violence 
that the Government conceded that it would be difficult to persuade the public that the 
purpose of the suspended sentence was not to provide a soft way of dealing with criminals, 
but to give the courts a wider choice of methods of dealing with offenders. 
The addition of the “excepted offences” schedule (Schedule 3 of the CPO) to 
“exclude from the operation of the provisions which empower the courts to impose 
suspended sentences those kinds of offence which are causing particular concern” was, in 
view of the firm opposition from within Government, a necessary concession to enacting the 
new suspended sentencing power. The Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council were 
said to be unified in their opposition to the passing of the Clause without provisions for the 
exemption of violent crimes from its operation.
24
 
In addition to the power to amend the Schedule by resolution of the Council, 
amendment by way of the order of Governor in Council was approved, so that the list might 
be amended quickly when necessary.  Indeed, the Attorney General, Mr Denys Roberts, also 
added that it was hoped that it might not be long before it was “possible to do away with it 
[the Schedule]” altogether.25  Since the enactment of the Bill however, in addition to one 
amendment (in section 6) and one replacement section relating to Part III of the Firearms and 
Ammunition Ordinance, three additional offences (section 33 of the Public Order Ordinance 
(Cap 245) and sections 4 and 10 of the Weapons Ordinance (Cap 217)) have been added to 
the Schedule, while no offences have been removed from the schedule.  A provision for 
removal of offences is found in section 124 of the CPO, which provides that the “Legislative 
Council may, by resolution, from time to time amend Schedule 3.” 
                                                 
24
 Mr. Oswald Cheung, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 20th January 1971, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 
Bill 1971, resumption of debate on second reading. Available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h710120.pdf 
25
 Attorney General Mr. Roberts, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 20th January 1971, Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Bill 1971, resumption of debate on second reading. Available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-
71/h710120.pdf 
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List of Excepted Offences 
The original list of excepted offences included the offences of manslaughter, rape, attempted 
rape, affray, indecent assault and attempted indecent assault under the then Protection of 
Women and Juveniles Ordinance, and other offences under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 
Offences against the Persons Ordinance, Arms and Ammunition Ordinance and Theft 
Ordinance.  Comparing the original list to the terms of the UK exceptions clause, what 
appears to have happened is that the Hong Kong architects borrowed the UK clause to create 
a general exceptions list that became Schedule 3.  But this was hardly the intention of the UK 
clause, which was to limit mandatory suspension in favour of judicial discretion.  It was 
never the intention of the UK Act to limit judicial discretion in sentencing. 
Despite the legislative intent to facilitate changes to the scheduled list, there have 
been few changes to the list.  The last change occurred in 1981 when new firearms and 
weapons offences were added.  No offences have come off the list.  For details of the 
maximum imprisonment terms and historical background to the excepted offences, see 
Appendix 1.  The current list of excepted offences (referring only to the section heading 
when offences against specific provisions is listed) is as follows: 
1. Manslaughter 
2. Rape 
3. Attempted rape 
4. Affray 
5. Trafficking in dangerous drugs 
6. Supplying dangerous drugs  
7. Manufacture of dangerous drugs 
8. Administering poison or wounding with intent to murder 
9. Destroying or damaging building with intent to murder 
10. Setting fire or casting away ship with intent to murder 
11. Attempting to administer poison, or shooting, or attempting to shoot or drown, 
etc. with intent to murder 
12. Attempting to commit murder by means not specified 
13. Shooting or attempting to shoot, or wounding or striking with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm 
14. Wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm 
15. Attempting to choke, etc. in order to commit indictable offence 
16. Using chloroform, etc. in order to commit indictable offence 
17. Administering poison, etc., so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily 
harm 
18. Administering poison, etc., with intent to injure, etc. 
19. Causing bodily injury by gunpowder, etc. 
20. Causing gunpowder to explode, etc., or throwing corrosive fluid, with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm 
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21. Placing gunpowder near building, etc., with intent to do bodily injury 
22. Assault with intent to commit offence, or on police officer, etc. 
23. Forcible taking or detention of person with intent to sell him 
24. Indecent assault 
25. Attempted indecent assault 
26. Possession of arms or ammunition without license 
27. Dealing in arms or ammunition without a license 
28. Giving possession of arms or ammunition to unlicensed person and obtaining 
possession by false pretences 
29. Possession of arms or ammunition with intent to endanger life 
30. Resisting arrest with or committing offence while in possession of arms or 
ammunition or imitation firearm 
31. Carrying arms or ammunition or imitation firearm with criminal intent 
32. Trespassing with arms or ammunition or imitation firearm 
33. Possession of an imitation firearm 
34. Converting imitation firearm into firearm 
35. Dangerous or reckless use of a firearm, etc. 
36. Failure to comply with terms and conditions of licence, etc. 
37. Robbery 
38. Aggravated burglary 
39. Possession of offensive weapon in public place 
40. Possession of prohibited weapons 
41. Offences relating to martial arts weapons 
 
While most of the offences on the list are indictable offences (and many punishable 
by life imprisonment), there are some offences that must or can be tried summarily, where 
the maximum punishment would be two or three years imprisonment (e.g. trafficking in 
dangerous drugs, supplying dangerous drugs, assaulting a police officer, giving possession of 
arms or ammunition to unlicensed persons, possession of imitation firearm, failure to comply 
with terms and conditions of a firearms licence, possession of an offensive weapon in a 
public place, possession of a prohibited weapon and offences relating to martial arts 
weapons).   
It is also important to note that the list includes only two inchoate offences: attempted 
rape and attempted indecent assault.  For all other offences it is the complete offence that has 
been excepted.  So, for example, a person convicted of attempted wounding or conspiracy to 
traffic in dangerous drugs can in theory receive a suspended sentence of imprisonment. 
Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
This study examined the sentencing provisions in five common law jurisdictions to find 
comparisons for the Hong Kong suspended sentence power.  The following jurisdictions 
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were considered: Australia (Victoria), New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, and the United 
Kingdom.  The study tried to determine if the criminal courts in these jurisdictions had a 
similar suspended sentence power and if so whether it was subject to the same list of 
exceptions.  If the jurisdiction did not have a similar suspended sentence power, comparable 
sentencing measures were analyzed.  For those jurisdictions that either reformed or abolished 
the judicial power to order a suspension of a sentence of imprisonment, the study considered 
the historical and statutory backdrop for the reform and describes the new reform measures. 
The following is a brief summary of the findings relating to the five jurisdictions.  Appendix 
2 provides a more detailed study of each of the five jurisdictions. 
In Australia (Victoria), the Sentencing Act 1991 provides the legislative basis for 
suspended sentences. Section 27(1) details the matters the court must have regard to when 
considering whether it is desirable to make an order suspending a sentence of imprisonment. 
These include the impact on the victim, the adequate manifestation of denunciation by the 
court of the conduct of the offender, the gravity of the offence, whether the offender has a 
previous suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed on him and is in breach of that order, 
and the degree of risk of the offender committing another offence punishable by 
imprisonment during the operational period of the sentence. The Sentencing Further 
Amendment Act of 2010 meanwhile deemed that suspended sentences were no longer 
available for ‘significant offences’, i.e. offences where the offender had caused serious injury 
recklessly against section 17 of the Crimes Act, where the offence was that of aggravated 
burglary, where the offence was arson-related (contrary to ss197 or 197A of the Crimes Act), 
or where the offence was related to trafficking, contrary to sections 71 or 71AA of the Drugs, 
Poisons and Controlled Substances Act.  
In New Zealand, the option of suspending sentences of imprisonment was abolished 
by the Sentencing Act 2002.  Previously the suspended sentence power was similar to the 
1967 UK and current HK provision, but without excepted offences. The 2002 Act introduced 
a statutory hierarchy of sentencing and orders, from the least restrictive (a discharge or order 
to come up for sentence if called on) to the most restrictive (i.e. imprisonment).  In 2007 
further amendments were made to the Act to enhance the number of community-based 
sentences available to the court when sentencing. Offenders can now be subject to curfews at 
specific addresses; electronic monitoring of curfews was introduced and the court was 
empowered to sentence offenders to home detention immediately where it would otherwise 
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have sentenced an offender to a short term of imprisonment. Prior to the amendments, the 
decision of whether home detention would be a suitable alternative to imprisonment was left 
to the Parole Boards.  
In Canada, the term ‘conditional sentencing’ is used to denote the imposition of a 
suspended sentence of imprisonment that is served in the community with conditions.
26
  
There are four criteria that must be met before a conditional sentence can be considered by 
the sentencing judge: the offence for which the person has been convicted cannot be an 
expressly excluded one; the sentencing judge must have determined that the offence should 
be subject to a term of imprisonment of less than two years; the sentencing judge must be 
satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the 
community; and the sentencing judge must be satisfied that the conditional sentence would 
be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing as set out in the 
Criminal Code.
27
  The list of excluded offences include serious personal injury offences 
defined in section 752, a terrorism offence or a criminal organization offence prosecuted by 
way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years or more or an 
offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment.  Sexual assault is within the 
definition of ‘serious personal injury offence’ and when prosecuted on indictment could not 
be sentenced by way of a conditional sentence. 
As in Hong Kong, in the United Kingdom suspended sentences count as custodial 
sentences, and are thus only appropriate where imprisonment is the only option available to 
the court. Following the passing of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act in 2012, courts are empowered to suspend sentences for custodial periods of up to 24 
months. The 2012 Act also gave courts more discretion with regard to whether or not to 
impose community requirements (such as programme participation requirements, curfew 
requirements, mental health treatment requirements) on offenders. The Act also introduced 
the option of fining offenders who breach the terms of their suspended sentence. The fine 
may be imposed while allowing the original order to continue, giving the courts more options 
                                                 
26
 The term ‘suspended sentence’ in Canada refers to a sentence which is passed under section 731(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code. It refers to the suspension of the passing of sentence (i.e. no custodial sentence is imposed) and 
directs that the offender be released on such conditions as prescribed in the offender’s probation order. A breach 
of the suspended sentence is a new offence under this arrangement, whereas a breach of a conditional sentence 
is not a new offence, but one which will trigger the power of the court to compel the offender to serve the 
remaining term of imprisonment. 
27
 Criminal Code, s. 742.1. 
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when dealing with offenders who breach the conditions of their suspended sentence.    There 
are no excepted offences in relation to the UK power. 
There is no legal provision allowing Singaporean courts to suspend a sentence of 
imprisonment after it has been passed.  An offender may, however, after having been 
convicted of an offence for which the sentence has been held in abeyance, seek to obtain a 
conditional discharge. Under the terms of a conditional discharge, an offender is discharged 
from the requirement to serve the sentence associated with the offence, provided he commits 
no offence during such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the order.  Only 
offenders convicted of offences ‘not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law’ 
(i.e. either a mandatory minimum or a mandatory maximum) can avail themselves of the 
provisions pertaining to conditional discharges.  
Arguments in Favour of Reform 
The main argument in favour of maintaining the list of excepted offences appears to be 
historical.  It was the concern in the early 1970s with the prevalence of violent crime in the 
community that required exceptions to what appeared to local legislators then as being a soft 
sentencing option being introduced by the colonial government.  This rationale is hardly 
persuasive today to justify the continued maintenance of the list of excepted offences.  Times 
have changed considerably, and it appears complacency has taken over our system of 
sentencing.  As this study has found, the list of exceptions has not been reviewed or updated 
for several decades.  There are now many substantial reasons in favour of abolishing the list 
entirely or, in the alternative, removing those offences that do not invariably cause serious 
physical violence to others.  Six reasons are discussed below.  
1. Fall in prevalence of violent crimes 
The significant fall in the prevalence of violent crimes in Hong Kong since the 1970s is an 
important societal circumstance to consider when evaluating the need to maintain or reform 
list of excepted offences to the suspended sentence power.  Historical data on the incidences 
of reported violent crime in the years 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 show that the numbers have 
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fallen significantly in that three-decade period.
28
  For example, in 1975, there were 20,912 
reports of violent crime.  In 2005, the number had fallen to 13,890.  Moreover, in this 30-year 
period, the population grew substantially from 4,366,600 to 6,813,200,
29
 meaning that the per 
capita rate of reported violent crime had decreased by 43 percent. Indeed it is not a mere 
accident that Hong Kong has a reputation of being regarded amongst the safest cities in the 
world.
30
 
This reality undercuts the historical basis for having the list of exceptions to the 
suspended sentence power when it was first enacted in 1971.  In accepting the compromise of 
excepted offences, the Attorney General in 1971 had said that he hoped someday it was no 
longer necessary to have the list.  In view of the social and economic progress that Hong 
Kong has made in the past 40 years, one suspects the list is long past its expiry date.  
2. Possible injustice: too harsh or too soft 
In the absence of a suspended sentence option, offenders, whose circumstances could merit a 
suspension, will normally be imprisoned.  It is well known that the offences in Schedule 3, 
though serious, can occur in a wide-range of circumstances.  Even manslaughter in certain 
exceptional cases may merit a non-custodial sentence.  This is what occurred in the 2011 
sentence review case of Secretary for Justice v Chan Man Yum Candy, where the Court of 
Appeal refused the application for a more severe sentence.
31
  In this case, the offender, who 
was suffering from a mental illness at the time, had killed her 13-month-old adopted daughter.  
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s sentence of three-years probation with treatment 
conditions.  
 Before 1997, the Court of Appeal had expressed concern with the lack of discretion to 
order a suspended sentence for excepted offences.  Attorney General v Ng Chak Hung was a 
case where the trial judge had quite clearly erred in suspending the sentence in a case of 
wounding with intent.
32
  However the Court of Appeal was sympathetic, remarking that it 
                                                 
28
 The absolute numbers are as follows: 20,912 (1975), 23,214 (1985), 17,087 (1995), 13,890 (2005).  See 
Tables 20.7, 21.1, 21.2, 23.3 and 26.1 in Carol Jones & Jon Vagg, Criminal Justice in Hong Kong (London: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
29
 Hong Kong 1976 (Hong Kong: Government of HK, 1976) 234 (App. 24); Hong Kong 2006 (Hong Kong: 
HKSAR Government, 2006) 476 (App. 25). 
30
 Hong Kong ranked 31 in Mercer’s Personal Safety Ranking 2011, see website of Marsh & McLennan 
Companies, www.mercer.com. 
31
 Secretary for Justice v Can Man Yum Candy, unreported, CAAR1/2010, 14 July 2011, CA. 
32
 Attorney General v Ng Chak Hung, unreported, CAAR1/1994, 2 Sept 1994, CA. 
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was “unfortunate that the Legislature [had] seen fit to remove the option of a suspended 
sentence from a sentencing judge in relation to a S. 17 offence which can vary greatly in its 
gravity”.33  In the end, the Court of Appeal ordered a sentence of probation to give the 
offender a “chance of rehabilitating himself”.34  This case points to a counter-tendency that 
can occur due to the lack of a middle road.  This is to order probation (or a community 
service order) when a more suitable disposition is a suspended sentence of imprisonment.  
Whether it is to sentence too harsh (imprisonment) or too soft (probation), it is inevitable for 
there to be cases involving excepted offences that will push the court in either of these 
directions given the lack of a suspended sentence alternative.  In this sense, injustice results.  
 Table 1 below shows four cases of indecent assault decided in the past two years 
where sentences of less than 2 years imprisonment were made.  These are all cases where the 
first-time offender would be unlikely to re-offend.  While sentences ranged from 
imprisonment to probation, it is arguable that the offenders were all good candidates for a 
suspended sentence.  We will never know in practice whether they would have received a 
suspended sentence.  But if the list of excepted offences did not exist, there was a real 
possibility that these cases may have been decided differently.  
 
Table 1: Possible Candidates for Suspended Sentence 
Case Circumstances Sentence 
HKSAR v Li Cheung-
Shing (D2), 
DCCC143/2012, 23 
May 2012, A. Tse DDJ 
-PG to Making Child Pornography (charge 1) and Indecent 
Assault (charge 2) 
-D2 met X (a 15-year old girl) in a motel room (meeting 
arranged by D1) to photo and video her in the nude; during the 
photo session, which lasted 1 hour, D2 molested her legs, 
breasts and private parts; X was paid $1,500 
-D2 was a 45-year-old teacher, first time offender, but had 10 
similar paid encounters with 16-year-old girls in the past; he 
was remorseful; wife and father-in-law had forgiven him; risk 
of re-offending was not high; he thought she was 16; will lose 
job and substantial pension; never teach again 
Imprisonment 
7m (7m for 
Charge 1; 6m for 
Charge 2, 
concurrent) 
HKSAR v Choi Donny, 
DCCC410/2011, 24 
Aug 2011, A Pang J 
-PG to Obtaining Access to a Computer with Dishonest Intent 
(2 charges) and Indecent Assault (1 charge) 
-video-taped two former students (aged 16 (X) and 18 (Y) at 
the time) while they were inside the toilet of D’s premises, on 
two separate occasions; X captured showering; Y captured 
urinating; when confronted by Y, D tried to embrace her, 
Imprisonment 
14m (7m 
consecutive for 
each of the access 
to a computer 
charges and 5m 
                                                 
33
 Ibid., para 6. 
34
 Ibid., para 18. 
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pulled her head to his chest, stroked her head and neck, tried to 
kiss her, hugged her and attempted another kiss then let go 
-29 years old, university educated teacher who had taught at 
secondary and primary schools; showed some suicidal 
tendency; first time offender; letters described him as diligent, 
competent, dedicated and responsible, showing care and 
concern for students 
concurrent for the 
indecent assault) 
HKSAR v Cheung 
Chun-sin, 
DCCC1164/2011, 5 
Mar 2012, Geiser J 
-PG to Indecent Assault (2 charges) 
-caressed thighs of 7 and 9 years old girls in computer room at 
school by school computer technician; asked them the colour 
of their underwear and caused girls great distress; admitted 
offences when arrested 
-24-years old with a clear criminal record; risk of re-offending 
moderate and treatment highly recommended; deep remorse; 
served 8m pre-sentence custody 
Probation 18m 
HKSAR v Chan Chi-hin 
(D2), 
HCCC206A/2011, 7 
Feb 2012, D Pang J 
 
-PNG.  Convicted of Indecent Assault (1 charge) 
-victim was intoxicated and sleeping; D2 pulled up her clothes 
and unbuttoned her pants; D2 fondled victim’s chest and 
inserted finger into her private parts; touched victim’s breasts 
again and then left room at D1’s instructions whereupon D1 
raped victim 
-27-years old salesman, educated to Form 5, no previous 
convictions; background unremarkable; degree of indecency 
limited; immediate imprisonment unnecessary  
Community 
Service Order 
(240 hrs) 
 
3. Maintaining judicial discretion 
Another important consideration is the need to allow judges and magistrates a wide degree of 
discretion to achieve a just and appropriate sentence.  This is consistent with the right to be 
free from disproportionate and arbitrary punishment and the approach of the Court of Final 
Appeal to sentencing matters generally.
35
  Historically our legislature has not adopted 
controversial minimum sentencing laws, and the approach post-1997 is to maintain a wide 
degree of discretion that will allow the judge to fashion an appropriate sentence in light of the 
individual circumstances of each case.   
The exceptions to the suspended sentence power are not only anachronistic 
(unanchored by their historical justification) but also apply across-the-board in a 
disproportionate manner to all offenders charged with certain offences irrespective of 
circumstances.  As already noted, the range of possible circumstances involving indecent 
assault, for example, is quite vast and serious violence is not a necessary ingredient of the 
                                                 
35
 See generally Mark Anthony Seabrook v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 184; Wong Chung Cheong v HKSAR 
(2001) 4 HKCFAR 12; Lau Cheong v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415. 
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offence.  Thus the excepted offences straitjacket judicial discretion and impair the ability of 
courts to do justice in individual cases.  
4. No increased risk to the community 
There is no reason to believe that repeal of Schedule 3 will result in an increased incidence of 
violent crime in the Hong Kong community.  Courts will continue to reserve suspended 
sentences for exceptional cases where there is little if any risk of recidivism. English 
experience with suspended sentences and indecent assault is instructive.  English courts have 
been careful to restrict suspended sentences in sexual offence cases to only circumstances 
that are truly exceptional.
36
   
It is also important to bear in mind that the Hong Kong suspended sentence power 
allows for the imposition of conditions, which if breached during the operational period can 
trigger the court’s jurisdiction to order that the suspended sentence be served in its entirety.  
In this way, it is not necessary to wait until the offender commits another offence before the 
threat of the suspended sentence can materialize and the person is taken into custody.  
5. Illogical list of exceptions 
As mentioned above, the list of offences in Schedule 3 was last amended in 1981.  The main 
consequence of this inattention is the illogicality and anomalies that can be seen when the list 
is closely reviewed against the underlying purpose of excepting violent crimes.  The 
illogicalities are of two kinds.  First, there is the omission of many other serious and violent 
offences from the list.  Some obvious omissions are offences in the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 
200) such as treason, incitement to mutiny, piracy with violence, causing explosion likely to 
endanger life or property, and arson endangering life – all offences punishable by life 
imprisonment.  Perhaps these were left out because it was felt that if convicted of such 
offences, a suspended sentence would normally be out of the question.  But the same might 
also be said about some of the serious offences that already appear on the Schedule 3 list, 
such as those that involve the intention to murder.  Another anomaly is the omission of many 
                                                 
36
 For cases where a suspended sentence was granted, see Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 
WLR 41 (CA); R v Arnold Weston [1996] 1 Cr App R(S) 297 (CA), and refused in Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 39 of 2006) [2007] 1 Cr App R(S) 34 (CA); Attorney General’s Reference (No 97 of 2003) [2004] 
EWCA Crim 1626 (CA); Attorney General’s Reference (No 67 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 403 (CA). 
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other serious sexual offences
37
 such as non-consensual buggery, assault with intent to commit 
buggery, gross indecency, bestiality, intercourse with a girl under 13 or under 16, intercourse 
with mentally incapacitated person, abduction of unmarried girl under 16, trafficking in 
persons to or from Hong Kong and so on.  There is no coherent rationale to keep indecent 
assault on the list while leaving out all these other sexual offences. Many other examples of 
omitted serious offences can also be found in other ordinances. 
 The second kind of illogicality concerns the less serious offences that already exist on 
the Schedule 3 list.  These are the summary conviction offences for which the maximum 
punishment is three years imprisonment or less.  Many of these offences can be committed 
without any actual physical violence inflicted on another person.  For example many of the 
firearm and weapons offences fall within this category.  The inchoate offence of attempt 
indecent assault would also fall within this category.  A person can be convicted of attempt 
indecent assault without any actual sexual touching (so long as more than merely preparatory 
steps were taken).  It would seem that restricting the availability of this sentencing option in 
such cases overshoots even the historical rationale for having the list of exceptions. 
 The illogicalities can give rise to a sense of unfairness and arbitrariness in that 
offenders who are guilty of serious offences committed in exceptional circumstances may be 
treated differently in terms of sentence because the offence for which they have been 
convicted may or may not be listed in Schedule 3. 
6. Comparative law supports removing or reducing list 
Of the jurisdictions studied that have a similar suspended sentence power (Victoria 
(Australia), Canada, UK), none have maintained exceptions as wide and extensive as those 
under the current Hong Kong law.  To be excepted in these other jurisdictions, the offence 
must typically involve significant violence or an element of organized crime.  In Canada, 
although sexual assault is included on their exceptions list, it appears to only apply when the 
offence is prosecuted on indictment but not when it is prosecuted by summary conviction. 
 New Zealand has tried new and innovative sentencing reforms that give the judge a 
wider range of discretion to order non-custodial sentences that have sufficient safeguards to 
protect the public.  Singapore has not adopted the suspended sentence power nor 
                                                 
37
 See Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200). 
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demonstrated new reform ideas in this area; it does not appear to offer much by way of 
comparative experience for Hong Kong.  
Conclusion 
This report concludes that there is a substantial case for abolishing the excepted offences to 
the suspended sentence power in Hong Kong.  The historical justification of not wanting to 
appear to be soft on violent crime when prevalence was high is no longer viable.  The 
important question is whether restoring judicial discretion to suspend sentences for excepted 
offences will contribute to more re-offending or violent crime generally.  There is no 
evidence to support such a belief.  Judges and magistrates in Hong Kong today can be relied 
upon to continue to imprison violent offenders or those who present a risk of re-offending.  
Suspending the sentence of someone who under current law would be sent to prison has its 
benefits both to society (e.g. rehabilitation and cost savings) and to the offender and his/her 
family (e.g. continue to work and provide for family).  For many offenders the criminal 
process itself and the suspended sentence regime are sufficient to deter the individual from 
re-offending.   
 This study recommends repealing Schedule 3, but one caveat needs to be mentioned. 
Schedule 3 also serves to list excepted offences in relation to section 109A of the CPO.  This 
section provides the norm that young offenders, aged between 16 and 20 years, should not be 
imprisoned unless there is no other appropriate method of dealing with the offender.  This 
norm however does not apply to excepted offences.  The study has not considered the 
implication of repealing Schedule 3 for the purposes of section 109A and a further study of 
this issue in the context of a general review of youth justice in Hong Kong is warranted.  
However, it should be noted that Schedule 3 was introduced for both suspended sentencing 
and the norm against youth imprisonment at the same time in 1971 as a result of the common 
concerns with the rise in youth violent crime at that time. 
 Moving one’s focus beyond the list of exceptions and having regard to overseas 
experience, it is also worthwhile to consider the question of more substantial reform, by 
asking whether the toolbox of non-custodial sentencing options is sufficient to do justice in 
current circumstances.  Hong Kong currently has a limited range of non-custodial sentencing 
options (e.g. discharges, probation, community service, fines, suspended sentences).  Other 
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jurisdictions have shown more innovation in this area, and Hong Kong may wish to consider 
whether any of these options should be adopted.  Some of the possible options for further 
discussion include 
 Paying a fine instead of being imprisoned where a suspended sentence condition has 
been breached or reoffending has occurred; 
 Deferred sentencing until after a period of rehabilitation has occurred; 
 More restrictive conditions imposed including home detention; 
 Intermittent sentences that allow prison sentences to be served on weekends, etc.   
The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong may want to consider undertaking a more 
comprehensive study of non-custodial sentencing options. 
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Appendix 1: Historical Background to Excepted Offences 
 
EXCEPTED OFFENCE MAXIMUM IMPRISONMENT 
SENTENCE 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Manslaughter 
 
 
Life imprisonment. Enacted in 1971 as part of the original bill 
introducing the suspended sentence 
power to Hong Kong (Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Bill 1971).  
The addition of the ‘excepted offences’ 
Schedule (Schedule 3 of the CPO) to 
“exclude from the operation of the 
provisions which empower the courts to 
impose suspended sentences those kinds 
of offence which are causing particular 
concern” was, in view of the firm 
opposition from within Government, a 
necessary concession to enacting the 
amendments.
38
  The Unofficial Members 
of the Legislative Council were said to be 
unified in their opposition to the passing 
of the Clause without provisions for the 
exception of violent crimes from its 
operation.
39
 
2. Rape or attempted rape 
 
 
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
3. Affray 
 
Conviction on indictment: 7 yrs 
imprisonment.
40
 
4. Any offence 
against section 4, 5 or 6 of 
the Dangerous Drugs 
Ordinance (Cap 134) 
 
 
Section 4 (Trafficking in 
dangerous drug):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
Summary conviction: 3yrs 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 5 (Dangerous drug not to 
be supplied except to person authorized 
or licensed to be in possession thereof):  
Conviction on indictment: 15 yrs 
imprisonment. 
Summary conviction: 3yrs 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 6 (Manufacture of 
dangerous drug):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
5. Any offence contrary 
to section 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20
, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 36   
or 42 of the Offences 
against the Person 
Ordinance (Cap 212) 
 
Section 10 (Administering poison or 
wounding with intent to murder):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 11 (Destroying or damaging 
building with intent to murder):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
                                                 
38
 Attorney General, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 20 January 1971, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 
1971, resumption of debate on second reading. Hong Kong Hansard, 20 January 1971, p 356, available at  
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h710120.pdf 
39
 Mr. Oswald Cheung, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 20 January 1971, Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 
Bill 1971, resumption of debate on second reading. Hong Kong Hansard, 20 January 1971, pp 349-350, 
available at  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-71/h710120.pdf 
40
 In Hong Kong, the offence of affray remains a common law offence.  See further The Queen v Le Van Luong 
[1989] HKCA 88; CACC210/198. 
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Section 12 (Setting fire or casting away 
ship with intent to murder):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 13 (Attempting to administer 
poison, or shooting, or attempting to 
shoot or drown, etc., 
with intent to murder):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 14 (Attempting to commit 
murder by means not specified):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 17 (Shooting or attempting to 
shoot, or wounding or striking with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 19 (Wounding or inflicting 
grievous bodily harm):  
Conviction on indictment: 3yrs 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 20 (Attempting to choke, etc., in 
order to commit indictable offence):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 21 (Using chloroform, etc., in 
order to commit indictable offence):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 22 (Administering poison, etc., 
so as to endanger life or inflict grievous 
bodily harm):  
Conviction on indictment: 10 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 23 (Administering poison, etc., 
with intent to injure, etc.):  
Conviction on indictment: 3 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 28 (Causing bodily injury 
by gunpowder, etc.):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 29 (Causing gunpowder to 
explode, etc., or throwing corrosive 
fluid, with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm):  
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Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 30 (Placing gunpowder near 
building, etc., with intent to 
do bodily injury):  
Conviction on indictment: 14 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 36 (Assault with intent to 
commit offence, or on police 
officer, etc.):  
Conviction either summarily or on 
indictment: 2 yrs imprisonment 
 
Section 42 (Forcible taking or 
detention of person with intent to 
sell him):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
6. Any offence or attempted 
offence against section 
122 of the Crimes 
Ordinance (Cap 200). 
(Amended 1 of 1978 s. 8) 
 
[Originally, “Any offence or 
attempted offence against 
section 7 of the Protection 
of Women and Juveniles 
Ordinance.”] 
Section 122 (Indecent assault): 
Conviction on indictment: 10 yrs 
imprisonment 
Enacted in 1971 as part of the original bill 
introducing the suspended sentence 
power to Hong Kong (Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Bill 1971), but originally 
referred to indecent assault as 
criminalized in s 7 of the Protection of 
Women and Juveniles Ordinance. 
The Crimes (Amendment) Bill of 1977 
enhanced the maximum for indecent 
assault to 5 yrs imprisonment on 
indictment. The amendment was part of a 
parcel of enhanced maximums for sexual 
offences passed in the Legislature as a 
means of deterring the exploitation of 
women for sexual purposes.
41
 
No debate or comments on the prevalence 
or manner of indecent assaults being 
committed in Hong Kong occurred during 
the readings of the Bill, or any discussion 
of why the enhancement of the maximum 
for this offence was packaged with a set 
of amendments largely enacted in 
response to public concern over the issues 
surrounding prostitution, abuse and 
trafficking of women in the city, and, in 
particular, the role of the triads in this 
scenario.  
The penalty for indecent assault was 
raised further, increasing the maximum to 
                                                 
41
 The discussion of the Members on the thrust of the Bill and the impetus for enhanced tariffs can be seen in the 
Second Reading, at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr76-77/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h770119.pdf, and the Resumption 
of the debate on the Second Reading, available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr77-
78/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h771221.pdf  
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10yrs imprisonment in 1991 as part of the 
series of reforms of the Crimes Ordinance 
made to decriminalize homosexual acts. 
The legislature repealed the common law 
offence of buggery as well as the 
provisions of the Offences Against the 
Person Ordinance relating specifically to 
homosexual acts (ss 49 – 53), and it was 
deemed necessary as a result to extend to 
men and boys the protections offered to 
women and girls under the Crimes 
Ordinance in relation to sexual 
exploitation. The enhancement of the 
maximum for indecent assault under s 
122 was necessary in order to bring it in 
line with the penalty for indecent assault 
on a man under s 50(b) of the Offences 
Against the Person Ordinance, a section 
repealed by the Bill.
42
  
 
7. An offence under any 
section in Part III of 
the Firearms and 
Ammunition 
Ordinance (Cap 238). 
(Replaced 68 of 1981 s. 56) 
 
[Originally, “Any offence 
against section 4 of the 
Arms and Ammunition 
Ordinance.”] 
[NB: Offences in Part III 
include the following ss 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, and 23.] 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 13 (Possession of arms or 
ammunition without licence):  
Conviction on indictment: 14 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 14 (Dealing in arms or 
ammunition without a licence):  
Conviction on indictment: 10 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 15 (Giving possession of arms 
or ammunition to unlicensed person 
and obtaining possession by false 
pretences):  
Conviction on indictment for knowingly 
permitting or allowing another to obtain 
possession without licence: 5 yrs 
imprisonment (sub-s 1) 
 
Summary conviction for knowingly 
producing a false licence: 2 yrs 
imprisonment (sub-s 4) 
 
Section 16 (Possession of arms or 
ammunition with intent to 
endanger life):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment. 
 
Section 17 (Resisting arrest with or 
committing offence while in possession 
of arms or ammunition 
or imitation firearm):  
The original 1971 ordinance excepted 
offences in one section of the Arms and 
Ammunition Ordinance.  In 1981, this 
item was replaced with many new 
offences under the Firearms and 
Ammunition Ordinance.   
The replacement arose as a result of the 
question of restricting the sale of toy 
pistols. The matter was highlighted as a 
result of an increase in robberies 
committed with such imitation firearms, 
and increasing public concern over the 
increase in incidents involving the use of 
firearms and/or imitation firearms.  
The issue of imitation, or ‘toy’, pistols 
which could be converted into real 
firearms, was previously considered 
within the Government, but presented 
problems of legal definition and 
enforcement. The Arms and Ammunition 
Bill, as it was originally called, presented 
problems, in that the Government sought, 
through legislative reform, to separate 
and define imitation firearms from 
‘weapons’ (as they would henceforth be 
dealt with under the Weapons 
Ordinance). The Bill was renamed the 
‘Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance’ as 
a result. The creation of two separate 
ordinances was an effort to modernize the 
1933 Arms and Ammunition Ordinance, 
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 The Second Reading of the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1991 is available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr90-
91/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h910417.pdf. Resumption of the Debate on Second Reading at: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr90-91/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h910710.pdf  
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Conviction on indictment for making use 
of arms or ammunition or imitation 
firearm to resist or prevent lawful 
arrest: life imprisonment (sub-s 1) 
 
Conviction on indictment for having in 
possession ay arms or ammunition or 
imitation firearm at the time of 
committing an offence: 
14 yrs imprisonment (sub-s 2) 
 
Section 18 (Carrying arms or 
ammunition or imitation firearm 
with criminal intent):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment 
 
Section 19 (Trespassing with arms or 
ammunition or imitation firearm):  
Conviction on indictment: 14 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 20 (Possession of an 
imitation firearm):  
Summary conviction: 2 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Subsequent conviction under s 20 of an 
offence within Schedule III or under this 
Ordinance within 10 
yrs: 7 yrs imprisonment 
 
Section 21 (Converting imitation 
firearm into a firearm):  
Conviction on indictment: 14 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 22 (Dangerous or reckless 
use of firearm, etc.):  
Conviction on indictment: 7 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 23 (Failure to comply with 
terms and conditions of licence, etc.):  
Conviction on indictment: 10 yrs 
imprisonment.  Summary conviction: 6 
m imprisonment. (sub-s 1) 
 
Summary conviction of person holding 
an exemption under sub-s (3) but fails to 
comply with term or condition: 6 m 
imprisonment (sub-s 2) 
 
Summary conviction of person who fails 
the provisions and penalties of which did 
not reflect modern challenges.
43
  
Under the new Firearms and Ammunition 
Ordinance, imitation firearms would be 
dealt with in a more severe manner than 
weapons. 
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 Second Reading Firearms and Ammunition Bill 1981, available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr80-
81/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h810730.pdf  
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to comply with term or condition 
imposed by the Commissioner: 6 m 
imprisonment (sub-s 3) 
 
8. Any offence 
against section 10 or 12 of 
the Theft Ordinance (Cap 
210) 
 
Section 10 (Robbery):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment 
 
Section 12 (Aggravated burglary):  
Conviction on indictment: life 
imprisonment 
Enacted in 1971 as part of the original bill 
introducing the suspended sentence 
power to Hong Kong (Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Bill 1971).  
 
9. Any offence against 
section 33 of the Public 
Order Ordinance (Cap 245). 
(Added L.N. 250 of 1972) 
 
 
Section 33 (Possession of offensive 
weapon in public place):  
If of the age of 25 yrs or more, summary 
conviction or conviction on indictment: 
3 yrs imprisonment 
 
If under the age of 14, to be dealt with 
under the provisions of the Juvenile 
Offenders Ordinance (Cap  226)  
 
If the offender is not less than 14 yrs of 
age but has not yet attained 
17 yrs of age: 
(i) to imprisonment for not more than 
3 years;  
(ii) to a detention order under the 
provisions of the Detention 
Centres Ordinance (Cap 239), but 
subject to the provisions of 
that Ordinance; 
(iii) subject to the provisions of 
the Training Centres Ordinance (Cap 
280); or 
(iv) subject to the provisions of 
the Rehabilitation Centres 
Ordinance (Cap 567). 
 
If the offender is not less than 17 yrs of 
age but has not yet attained 
25 yrs of age: 
(i) to imprisonment for not more than 
3 years;  
(ii) to a detention order under the 
provisions of the Detention Centres 
Ordinance (Cap 239), but subject to 
the provisions of that Ordinance; or 
(iii) subject to the provisions of 
the Rehabilitation Centres 
Ordinance (Cap 567). 
Motion for the addition of this offence to 
Schedule 3 was made by the Attorney 
General, Mr. Denys Roberts, in the 
Legislative Council on 15 November 
1972.  
 
The Attorney General spoke on the steady 
and substantial growth of the volume of 
crimes of violence in his Motion, and 
noted that the welfare of the inhabitants 
of Hong Kong was perhaps the main 
concern citizen’s looked toward in 
assessing the effectiveness of 
Government.  
 
The situation regarding public safety was 
of such concern that the Attorney General 
proposed to move a resolution, 
under s 124 of the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance, to add the offence of 
possession of an offensive weapon to 
those in relation to which a sentence of 
imprisonment may not be suspended. 
 
The object of this amendment was to act 
as a substantial deterrent in the effort to 
prevent the carrying of offensive 
weapons.  During the motion, mention 
was also made of the possibility of 
introducing mandatory minimum 
sentences also for robbery or serious 
assaults should the efforts to curb 
offences of this nature fail, and 
alternatively to consider the return of ‘a 
form of rigorous imprisonment for use in 
the case of those convicted of crimes 
involving violence’. The object of such a 
regime would be to introduce a tougher 
and more exacting prison regime than 
applicable to ordinary prisoners.
44
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  Legislative Council Proceedings, Wednesday, 15 November 1972. Available at: 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr72-73/h721115.pdf  
  
 
 
 29  
 The debates on the 1971 Corporal 
Punishment Amendment (Amendment) 
Bill 1971, which added s 33 offences to 
the list of those cases for which corporal 
punishment might be awarded to persons 
aged 16 or more, also pointed to the 
increase in the number of individuals 
tried for this type of offence. The offence 
was added to the list of offences covered 
under the Bill in the hope that it would act 
as a deterrent.
45
  
 
10. Any offence 
under section 4 or 10 of 
the Weapons 
Ordinance (Cap 217). 
(Added 69 of 1981 s. 19)  
Section 4 (Possession of 
prohibited weapons):  
Summary conviction: 3 yrs 
imprisonment 
 
Section 10 (Offences relating to 
martial arts weapons 
Summary conviction: 2 yrs 
imprisonment 
Summary conviction on the sub-s 2 
offence: 3 years imprisonment 
Added to list in 1981 with the enactment 
of the Weapons Ordinance (Cap 217), 
Ord. 69 of 1981. 
For a discussion of the addition of 
weapons-related offences in 1981, see 
above on the creation of separate 
ordinances for firearms and weapons 
related offences. With separate 
ordinances, came the need to update the 
provisions under Schedule 3 to reflect the 
new offences.  
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 Second Reading, Corporal Punishment (Amendment) Bill 1971, available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr70-
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Appendix 2: Comparative Study 
1. Australia (Victoria) 
Introduction 
A suspended sentence in Australia is a sentence which is, like its Hong Kong counterpart, a 
sentence of imprisonment which is not put into effect. It allows judges to decide that while an 
offence might be serious enough to attract a jail term, owing to the particular circumstances 
of the offence, all or some of the imprisonment should be suspended. If an offender breaches 
the term(s) of the suspended sentence by committing another offence, they are liable to serve 
the remainder of the suspended sentence in prison.  
Recommendations of the Sentencing Advisory Council 
In 2006 and 2008, the Sentencing Advisory Council (SAC) – a Victorian statutory body 
which researches sentencing and advises the government – published reports on suspended 
sentences. In its first report, the Council recommended phasing out suspended sentences over 
three years, along with changes to other community based orders. In its second report, the 
Council did not recommend abolishing suspended sentences. Instead, it suggested changes to 
a number of sentencing options, and the monitoring of the impact of these changes before any 
decision was made on the future of suspended sentences. 
The findings of the SAC and the election of new State Governments elected on platforms of 
deterrence of crime through retributive mechanisms (such as imprisonment) have informed 
numerous changes to the laws surrounding suspended sentences in recent years. In 2006, 
limitations were enacted restricting the use of suspended sentences for serious offences – 
including murder, manslaughter, intentionally causing serious injury, armed robbery, rape 
and some other sexual offences to cases where there are exceptional circumstances.
46
 
In October 2010, the Government further removed suspended sentences for all ‘serious 
offences’, including armed robbery, sexual penetration of a child under 16 and trafficking in 
a commercial quantity of a drug of dependence. The Sentencing Further Amendment Act 
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 Sentencing (Suspended Sentences) Act 2006 Act No. 82/2006 
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2010 also created a new intensive correction management order as an alternative to a 
suspended sentence. This order quickly fell out of favour and was replaced as of January 
2012 with the community correction order (CCO). The distinction between the intensive 
correction management order and the CCO is that the latter, while served in the community, 
can also include up to three months’ imprisonment.  
Legislative basis for suspended sentences 
Section 27(1A) of the Sentencing Act 1991 describes the circumstances under which courts 
in Victoria may order or refrain from ordering a suspended sentence. That section provides: 
27(1A) In considering whether it is desirable in the circumstances to make an order 
suspending a sentence of imprisonment, a court must have regard to— 
 (a) the need, considering the nature of the offence, its impact on any victim of the 
offence and any injury, loss or damage resulting directly from the offence, to ensure 
that the sentence— 
 (i) adequately manifests the denunciation by the court of the type of conduct 
in which the offender engaged; and 
 (ii) adequately deters the offender or other persons from committing offences 
of the same or a similar character; and 
 (iii) reflects the gravity of the offence; and 
 (b) any previous suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed on the offender and 
whether the offender breached the order suspending that sentence; and 
 (c) without limiting paragraph (b), whether the offence was committed during the 
operational period of a suspended sentence of imprisonment; and 
 (d) the degree of risk of the offender committing another offence punishable by 
imprisonment during the operational period of the sentence, if it were to be 
suspended. 
Limitations restricting the use of suspended sentences  
As noted above, the Sentencing Further Amendment Act of 2010 deemed that suspended 
sentences were no longer available for ‘significant offences’. These offences have been 
defined in section 3 of the 2010 Act as meaning — 
(a) an offence against section 17 of the Crimes Act 1958 , (causing serious injury 
recklessly) unless heard and determined summarily;  
(b) an offence against section 77 of the Crimes Act 1958, (aggravated burglary) 
unless heard and determined summarily;  
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(c) an offence against section 197 of the Crimes Act 1958, where the offence is one of 
destroying or damaging property by fire (arson) unless heard and determined 
summarily;  
(d) an offence against section 197A of the Crimes Act 1958 , (arson causing death);  
(e) an offence against section 71 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 
1981 , (trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a drug of dependence);  
(f) an offence against section 71AA of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances 
Act 1981 , (trafficking in a commercial quantity of a drug of dependence)… 
Abolition of intermediate orders 
The 2010 Amendment Act has abolished the four intermediate sentencing orders (i.e. those 
orders sitting between fines and imprisonment). Courts may now no longer sentence 
offenders to a combined custody and treatment order; to home detention; to an intensive 
community order; nor to a community-based order.   The abolished intermediate orders have 
been replaced with the community correction order (CCO). 
Deferral 
As of January 2012, the Magistrates and County Courts in Victoria may now defer 
sentencing for up to 12 months for offenders of any age.
47
 Deferral of sentence gives 
offenders the opportunity to take part in programs designed to curb the risk of re-offending 
and address the cause of their behavior. The courts can then take into account offender 
participation and rehabilitation efforts when sentencing.  
Community correction order (CCO) 
The Magistrates Courts are empowered to impose a CCO for a maximum of two years. In 
addition, a CCO can be imposed by higher courts for up to the statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment for that offence. For example, for the offence of theft the maximum length of a 
CCO could be up to 10 years – the same as the maximum term of imprisonment available for 
that offence. 
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 This option was previously only available in the Magistrates Courts for up to 6 months and for offenders 
between the ages of 18 – 25. 
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Conditions48 
All those sentenced to a CCO must abide by basic conditions, such as not reoffending, not 
leaving Victoria without permission and abiding by any order of the Secretary of the 
Department of Justice. 
Each CCO will also include at least one other ‘optional’ condition chosen according to the 
purposes of sentencing for that offender and that offence. Optional conditions that may be 
attached to a CCO for all or part of its duration can require the offender to: 
 undertake medical treatment or other rehabilitation  
 remain free of alcohol and/or drugs  
 not enter, remain within or consume alcohol in a licensed premise (hotel, club, 
restaurant)  
 complete unpaid community work up to a total of 600 hours  
 be supervised, monitored and managed by a corrections worker  
 abstain from contact or association with particular people (e.g. their co-offenders)  
 live (or not live) at a specified address  
 stay away from nominated places or areas  
 abide by a curfew, remaining at a specified place for two to 12 hours each day  
 be monitored and reviewed by the court to ensure compliance with the order  
 pay a bond – a sum of money that may be forfeited wholly or partly if the offender 
fails to comply with any condition imposed.  
An offender who breaches the conditions of their CCO may be resentenced for the original 
offence and face an additional three months’ imprisonment or a fine of 30 penalty units. 
Optional conditions may be imposed for only part of a CCO. The court may fix a part of the 
total length of the CCO as an ‘intensive compliance period’ during which one or more of the 
conditions must be completed. 
Intensive compliance 
If a court imposes a community correction order of six months or longer, the court can set an 
intensive compliance period for part of the order. For example, if a community correction 
order is imposed for one year, an intensive compliance period might be fixed for a lesser 
period, such as six months. The court will order that one or more of the conditions attached to 
the community correction order must be completed during this intensive compliance period. 
                                                 
48
 Ibid. 
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2. New Zealand 
Suspension of sentences under the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993 
In New Zealand, the suspended prison sentence was introduced as a new sentencing option 
by the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993 (the 1993 Act).
49
 Under the provisions of the 
1993 Act, prison sentences of not less than six months and not more than two years could be 
suspended for a period not exceeding two years. If the offender was convicted of another 
imprisonable offence within the suspension period, the suspended sentence could be activated.  
There were excepted offences to the suspended sentence power.  In one of the first Court of 
Appeal judgments to consider the new provision, the following statements were made: 
Section 21A affords the Court an important additional discretionary power in 
attempting to meet the often conflicting demands requiring consideration on 
sentencing. It is we think plain that the principal purpose of the new provision 
is to encourage rehabilitation and provide the Courts with an effective means 
of achieving that end, by holding a prison sentence over the offender's head. 
Put another way it enables the Court to give the offender one last chance in a 
manner which clearly spells, out the consequences if he offends again. It is 
available to be used in cases of moderately serious offending but where it is 
thought there is a sufficient opportunity for reform, and the need to deter 
others is not paramount. Although not so limited, it may be particularly useful 
in cases of youthful offenders. To avoid any perception that the sentence is a 
soft option the legislature has given it teeth by providing that the length of the 
sentence of imprisonment is fixed at the time the suspended sentence is 
imposed, that it is to correspond in length to the term that would have been 
imposed in the absence of power to suspend, and that the Court before whom 
the offender appears on further conviction is to order the suspended 
sentence to take effect, unless of the opinion it would be unjust to do so. So 
there is a presumption that upon further offending punishable by 
imprisonment the term previously fixed will have to be served.
50
 
A statistical analysis conducted two years following the enactment of the 1993 
Amendments
51
 indicated that overall, 3.6% of offenders with proved cases in 1995 received a 
suspended sentence, either alone or in combination with another sentence. The factor most 
strongly predictive of a suspended sentence was the seriousness of the offence, with over 
                                                 
49
 See Criminal Justice Act 1985, s. 21A. 
50
 R v Petersen [1994] 2 NZLR 533, 537 (CA). 
51
Sentencing in New Zealand: A Statistical Analysis, available at: 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencing-in-new-zealand-a-statistical-
analysis/suspended-prison-sentences  
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20% of offences where the average length of imprisonment was 150-300 days resulting in 
suspended sentences. 
Sentencing Act 2002 
In the lead up to the 1999 election, a Referendum on the criminal justice system in New 
Zealand was held, with the public being asked: “Should there be a reform of our Justice 
system placing greater emphasis on the needs of victims, providing restitution and 
compensation for them and imposing minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious 
violent offences?" The public response was an 84% voter turn-out, with over 91% of voters 
agreeing to the question.
52
 
In response, the Government passed two acts, the Sentencing Act 2002, and the Parole Act 
2002, which served as substitute for the Criminal Justice Act 1985. Among the sweeping 
changes to the sentencing provisions of courts was the abolition of suspended sentences.  
Hansard records on Questions to Ministers during the debates over the abolition of suspended 
sentences indicate that the primary reason they had fallen out of favour as a sentencing option 
was owing to their ‘net-widening’ effect. 53  It was thought that people who would not 
otherwise receive a sentence of imprisonment were receiving suspended sentences, and that 
when these individuals breached the conditions attached to their suspension and activated the 
period of imprisonment attached to the suspension, the result was that these offenders, who 
would not normally spend time in prison for their offences were doing so, and in large 
numbers.  
The 2002 Sentencing Act also introduced a statutory hierarchy of sentences and orders, 
which delineated the range of sentences and orders available to the courts.
54
 These include 
                                                 
52
Sentencing reform in New Zealand: An analysis of the Sentencing Act 2002, available at: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3370/is_3_36/ai_n29057975/  
53
 See, Hansard, Questions to Ministers 14 September 2001, Question number 12913. 
54
 The Hierarchy of sentences and orders, of the Sentencing Act 2002, s 10A provides: 
   10A Hierarchy of sentences and orders 
(1) The hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in subsection (2) reflects the relative level 
of supervision and monitoring of, and restrictions imposed on, an offender under each 
sentence or order. 
(2) The hierarchy of sentences and orders, from the least restrictive to the most restrictive, 
is as follows: 
(a) discharge or order to come up for sentence if called on: 
(b) sentences of a fine and reparation: 
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the power to order fines and reparations, the power to order community-based sentences with 
work or intensive supervision requirements attached, and the power to commit an offender to 
a period of home-detention.   
Criminal Justice Reform Bill 2006 
Despite Ministerial concerns expressed over the net-widening effect of suspended sentences, 
however, statistics indicate that in the six years leading up to 2005 (the latter three of which 
no power to suspend sentences existed), New Zealand's prison population increased by 23%, 
with almost half of the increase being made up of offenders on custodial remand, awaiting 
trial.
55
 By May of 2006, the number of prison inmates had reached a record high of 8076.
56
  
In an attempt to address this trend, Parliament introduced the Criminal Justice Reform Bill in 
December 2006.  
Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 
The Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 was one of those Acts to come out of the Criminal 
Justice Reform Bill. One of its most useful features is that it provides a greater number of 
community-based sentences available to the court when sentencing. In addition to the 
existing sentences of community work and supervision, new and more restrictive sentences 
of community detention and intensive supervision were added. Offenders sentenced to 
community detention are subject to a curfew at a certain address, which the court can impose 
at certain times to prevent further offending occurring. Electronic monitoring of curfews was 
also introduced, so that any breaches could be detected as soon as possible. 
Another major change under the Sentencing Amendment Act is the way in which home 
detention is administered. Under the previous system, the court was able to grant offenders 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years or less leave to apply for home detention, 
but the ultimate decision lay with the Parole Board. Now the process has been streamlined to 
reduce the number of offenders sentenced to imprisonment, by giving the court the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                       
(c) community-based sentences of community work and supervision: 
(d) community-based sentences of intensive supervision and community detention: 
(e) sentence of home detention: 
(f) sentence of imprisonment. 
55
 Effective Interventions, Cabinet Policy Committee, Paper 1 Overview, at para 30. 
56
 O'Driscoll DCJ, Prof Hall, G, Mellor, T, Sentencing Update, New Zealand Law Society, 2007, 2. 
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sentence offenders to home detention immediately where it would otherwise have sentenced 
the offender to a short-term sentence of imprisonment. The use of home detention in the past 
has also shown that offenders serving terms of imprisonment by that method have had lower 
rates of reconviction than even those completing community-based sentences.
57
  
Impact of custody on women and their children 
Criminologists in New Zealand have noted that the abolition of suspended sentences has had 
a profound impact and unintended contribution to the spiralling rates of imprisonment of 
women in the country in recent years.
58
 A disproportionate number of those receiving 
suspended sentences when they were available to the courts were women.
59
  The situation has 
been attributed to the fact that women were more likely to be first time offenders, to commit 
minor offences, to have responsibility for young children and are perceived as generally less 
likely to re-offend. The wider costs of unnecessary remand on women has also been noted in 
the UK,  where it has observed that women are more likely than men to be remanded to 
prison for offences which would not lead to a custodial sentence. According to the UK 
Ministry of Justice Criminal Statistics, in 2010 almost half of all women imprisoned were 
received on remand for example.
60
  
Community-based sentences 
It has been noted that the New Zealand sentencing provisions reiterate the concept of 
parsimony with regard to imprisonment in several ways. In section 8(g) of the 2002 Act for 
example, one of the principles of sentencing states that the court: "must impose the least 
restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances".  Furthermore, section 16(2) of 
the Act states that:  
The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that: 
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 Ibid., 14 
58
 Tolmie Julia, Women and the Criminal Justice System, Criminal Justice in New Zealand, 2007, LexisNexis 
New Zealand. 
59
 The Ministry of Justice Forecasts of the Male and Female Sentenced Prison Populations published in 2004 
indicated that 300-350 female offenders were receiving suspended sentences prior to their abolition, a very high 
number relative to the total prison population of female offenders of just 400-500.  
60
 Ministry of Justice (2010) Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2009, London, Ministry of Justice. 
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(a) a sentence is being imposed for all or any of the purposes in section 7(1)(a) 
to (c), (e), (f), or (g);
61
and 
(b) those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other than imprisonment; 
and 
(c) no other sentence would be consistent with the application of the principles 
in section 8 to the particular case. 
These principles, when combined with the addition of the statutory heirarchy of sentencing 
options, seek to alleviate the over-use of imprisonment in New Zealand. To avoid public 
perception that the courts may be going soft on criminals, protections have been put in place 
in ss46 and 47 of the 2002Act, which deem that a court may impose a sentence of supervision 
only if it is satisfied that a sentence of supervision would reduce the likelihood of further 
offending by the offender through the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender,  and 
that where a court imposes a sentence of supervision in respect of 2 or more offences 
(whether on the same occasion or on different occasions), the sentences must be served 
concurrently. 
 
3. Canada 
Conditional sentences 
‘Conditional sentencing’, introduced in Canada in September 1996, allows for sentences of 
imprisonment to be served in the community, rather than in a correctional facility.
62
  It is a 
                                                 
61
 Section 7(1) of the Act states that the purposes for which a court may sentence or otherwise deal with an 
offender are: 
(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the community by the offending; 
or 
(b) to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of, that harm; or 
(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or 
(d) to provide reparation for harm done by the offending; or 
(e) to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or 
(f) to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar offence; or 
(g) to protect the community from the offender; or 
(h) to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and reintegration; or 
(i) a combination of 2 or more of the purposes in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
62
 Conditional sentences were introduced by Bill C-41, now S.C. 1995, c. 22, proclaimed in force on 3 
September 1996, amending the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Amendments to the conditional 
sentencing regime were made by Bill C-51, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and 
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midway point between imprisonment and sanctions such as probation or fines, and is the 
equivalent of what Hong Kong courts would consider a provision enabling the suspension of 
a sentence of imprisonment.
63
 The conditional sentence was introduced as part of a review of 
the sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code. These provisions included the fundamental 
purpose and the principles of sentencing. The fundamental principle of sentencing is that a 
sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility 
of the offender, but allowance is made for specific aggravating circumstances, which should 
increase sentences notwithstanding.  During a conditional sentence, the offender is 
supervised and must follow the rules set by the judge or risk going to prison.  Since a 
conditional sentence is a prison term that the offender is allowed to serve in the community, 
according to set conditions, if the offender does not follow the conditions, he or she will be 
brought back to court and the judge can order the offender to serve the rest of the sentence in 
prison. 
A 2005 report by the Law and Government Division of the Canadian Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service describes the primary function of conditional sentencing as 
“reduc{ing} the reliance upon incarceration by providing an alternative sentencing 
mechanism to the courts. In addition, the conditional sentence provides an opportunity to 
further incorporate restorative justice concepts into the sentencing process by encouraging 
those who have caused harm to acknowledge this fact and to make reparation.”64 
Comparison of conditional sentences, suspended sentences and probation orders65 
There are several important differences between conditional sentences, suspended sentences, 
and probation orders. Firstly, unlike the suspended sentence under section 731(1)(a), the 
court acting under the conditional sentences provision actually imposes a sentence of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Substances Act and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,S.C. 1999, c. 5. The relevant part (clauses 39-
42) came into force on 1 July 1999.  
63
 The term ‘suspended sentence’ in Canadian law refers to a sentence which is passed under section 731(1)(a) 
of the Criminal Code. It differs from the use of the term in Hong Kong in that it does not impose a sentence of 
imprisonment, but rather refers to the suspension of the passing of the sentence and directs that the offender be 
released on such conditions as prescribed in the offender’s probation order. In Canada, the term ‘conditional 
sentence’ is used to denote the imposition of a suspended sentence of imprisonment that is served in the 
community, rather than in a correctional facility. 
64
 Library of Parliament, Conditional Sentences, available at: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0544-e.htm  
65
 Ibid. 
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imprisonment. This sentence, however, is served in the community, rather than in a 
correctional facility. 
Secondly, under section 742.3(2)(e) the court may order the offender to attend a treatment 
program as part of a conditional sentence. There is no statutory requirement for the 
offender’s consent as there is under section 732.1(3)(g) for probation orders. 
Thirdly, the wording of the residual clause in section 732.1(3)(h) dealing with optional 
conditions in probation orders states that one of their goals is to facilitate the offender’s 
successful reintegration into the community. This is unlike the residual clause in section 
742.3(2)(f) dealing with conditions of conditional sentences, which does not focus principally 
on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender and therefore authorizes the imposition 
of punitive conditions such as house arrest or strict curfews. This again emphasizes that 
conditional sentences are considered to be more punitive than probation orders. 
Finally, the punishment for breaching the conditions of a conditional sentence range from the 
court taking no action to the offender being required to serve the remainder of his or her 
sentence in custody. By contrast, breach of a probation order is made its own offence, with 
imprisonment a possible punishment. The differing consequences for breach of a condition is 
related to the fact that breaches of conditional sentence orders need be proved only on a 
balance of probabilities, while breaches of probation orders, since they constitute a new 
offence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Legislative basis for conditional sentencing 
The provisions governing conditional sentences are set out in sections 742 to 742.7 of the 
Criminal Code. These sections set out four criteria that must be met before a conditional 
sentence can be considered by the sentencing judge: 
1. The offence for which the person has been convicted must not be punishable by a 
minimum term of imprisonment; 
2. The sentencing judge must have determined that the offence should be subject to a 
term of imprisonment of less than two years; 
3. The sentencing judge must be satisfied that serving the sentence in the community 
would not endanger the safety of the community; and 
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4. The sentencing judge must be satisfied that the conditional sentence would be 
consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing as set out in 
sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.
66
 
In addition to meeting the criteria set out above, conditional sentences involve a number of 
compulsory conditions, as set out in section 742.3 of the Criminal Code. Under these 
conditions, the offender is compelled to: 
 Keep the peace and be of good behaviour; 
 Appear before the court when required to do so; 
 Report to a supervisor when required; 
 Remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless written permission to go outside 
that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the supervisor; and 
 Notify the court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and 
promptly notify the court or the supervisor of any change of employment or 
occupation. 
When is a conditional sentence possible? 
A judge can give an offender a conditional sentence when: 
 the Criminal Code does not set a minimum prison term for the offence; 
 the judge decides that the sentence should be less than two years; 
 the judge setting the sentence is convinced that allowing the offender to remain in the 
community is not a danger to the public; and 
 the judge is convinced that a conditional sentence is consistent with the purposes and 
principles of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code. 
The judge has the authority to decide on the appropriate punishment for the offender and 
could decide to send an offender to prison even if a conditional sentence is possible. 
What types of conditions can a judge set? 
All conditional sentences have compulsory conditions. Under these conditions, the offender 
is compelled to: 
 keep the peace and be of good behaviour; 
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 go to court when required; 
 report to a criminal justice system supervisor regularly; 
 stay in the area under the court's authority and get written permission to travel outside 
this area; and 
 tell the court or criminal justice system supervisor before moving or when changing 
jobs. 
In addition, a judge can tailor the conditions of the sentence to the needs of the offender, the 
victim and the community by setting other conditions that the offender has to follow. For 
example, the offender might be required to: 
 pay the victim restitution; 
 make other reparations to the victim or to the community; 
 participate in a treatment program (for example an alcohol, drug or anger 
management program); 
 provide support for any dependents (such as a child or spouse); 
 do up to 240 hours of community service work; or 
 respect a curfew, for instance by staying at home except to go to work or to approved 
activities, such as a treatment program or community service. 
As well, an offender could be prohibited from: 
 using alcohol or drugs, and 
 possessing a gun, rifle or other weapon. 
The Canadian Courts have made it clear that conditional sentences should generally include 
punitive conditions that restrict an offender's liberty, such as house arrest. The Court has said 
that a conditional sentence is a punishment, which also promotes a sense of responsibility in 
the offender and has the objectives of rehabilitation and reparation to the victim and the 
community.67 
Victims’ rights and conditional sentences 
A victim can prepare a victim impact statement, describing the harm done and the loss 
suffered. Although the victim impact statement should not include the victim's views on a 
punishment, it may help the judge to decide on appropriate conditions to include in a 
conditional sentence, if a conditional sentence is being considered. Judges must take victim 
impact statements into account when deciding the appropriate punishment for offenders.  
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Breaches of conditional sentences 
Section 742.6 of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure to be followed when one or more 
of the conditions of a conditional sentence is breached. The section contemplates that the 
allegation of the breach may be made out by documentary evidence. The allegation must be 
supported by a written report of the supervisor including, where possible, signed witness 
statements. The offender must be given a copy of this report. If the court is satisfied that a 
breach of a condition has been proved on a balance of probabilities, the burden is then on the 
offender to show a reasonable excuse. Where the breach is made out, the court may: take no 
action; change the optional conditions; suspend the conditional sentence for a period of time 
and require the offender to serve a portion of the sentence, and then resume the conditional 
sentence with or without changes to the optional conditions; or terminate the conditional 
sentence and require the offender to serve the balance of the sentence in custody.  
Conditional sentence case law68 
The criticism that has been directed at sentencing practices in Canada tends to focus on the 
nature of the offence. It often omits consideration of how the courts weigh the aggravating 
and mitigating factors relevant to the offender, and the circumstances surrounding the offence, 
in crafting an appropriate sentence. Through the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code, 
Parliament has placed a major emphasis on a “least restrictive measures” approach and has 
directed the courts to use incarceration only where community sentencing alternatives are not 
adequate. This is consistent with Parliament’s concern to address the overuse of incarceration 
as a response to crime in Canada and to provide for a restorative justice approach to 
sentencing. Collectively, these principles encourage flexibility in the exercise of judicial 
discretion. Over time, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada are providing 
more detailed guidance as to how the various principles should be applied to categories of 
offences and offenders. Examples of the cases that have considered various aspects of 
conditional sentencing are set out below.  
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Canadian Conditional Sentencing Cases 
R v Proulx69 
The most important case to consider conditional sentencing is the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Proulx. Here, the 
Court examined the issue of conditional sentences in a case that concerned a charge of dangerous driving causing death 
and bodily harm. Prior to this decision, judges had little guidance on when it was appropriate to impose a conditional 
sentence, outside of the criteria set out in the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court made it clear that a number of changes 
needed to be made to the way in which the sanction was used. But the judgment also consists of a strong endorsement of 
conditional sentencing. The Supreme Court set out a number of principles, which may be summarized as follows: 
1. Unlike probation, which is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool, a conditional sentence is intended to address 
both punitive and rehabilitative objectives. Accordingly, conditional sentences should generally include punitive 
conditions that restrict the offender’s liberty. Therefore, conditions such as house arrest or strict curfews should be 
the norm, not the exception.  
2. There is a two-stage process involved in determining whether to impose a conditional sentence. At the first stage, 
the sentencing judge merely considers whether to exclude the two possibilities of a penitentiary term or a 
probationary order as inappropriate, taking into consideration the fundamental purpose and principles of 
sentencing. At the second stage, having determined that the appropriate range of sentence is a term of 
imprisonment of less than two years, the judge should then consider whether it is appropriate for the offender to 
serve his or her sentence in the community. 
3. “Safety of the community,” which is one of the criteria to be considered by a sentencing judge, refers only to the 
threat posed by a specific offender and not to a broader risk of undermining respect for the law. It includes 
consideration of the risk of any criminal activity, including property offences. In considering the danger to the 
community, the judge must consider the risk of the offender re-offending and the gravity of the damage that could 
ensue. The risk should be assessed in light of the conditions that could be attached to the sentence. Thus, the 
danger that the offender might pose may be reduced to an acceptable level through the imposition of appropriate 
conditions. 
4. A conditional sentence is available for all offences in which the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. There is no 
presumption that conditional sentences are inappropriate for specific offences. Nevertheless, the gravity of the 
offence is clearly relevant to determining whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in the circumstances. 
5. There is also no presumption in favour of a conditional sentence if the prerequisites have been satisfied. Serious 
consideration, however, should be given to the imposition of a conditional sentence in all cases where these 
statutory prerequisites are satisfied. 
6. A conditional sentence can provide a significant amount of denunciation, particularly when onerous conditions are 
imposed and the term of the sentence is longer than would have been imposed as a jail sentence. Generally, the 
more serious the offence, the longer and more onerous the conditional sentence should be. 
7. A conditional sentence can also provide significant deterrence if sufficient punitive conditions are imposed, and 
judges should be wary of placing much weight on deterrence when choosing between a conditional sentence and 
incarceration. 
8. When the objectives of rehabilitation, reparation and promotion of a sense of responsibility may realistically be 
achieved, a conditional sentence will likely be the appropriate sanction, subject to considerations of denunciation 
and deterrence. 
9. While aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender increase the need for denunciation and 
deterrence, a conditional sentence may be imposed even if such factors are present. 
10. Neither party has the onus of establishing that the offender should or should not receive a conditional sentence. 
However, the offender will usually be best situated to convince the judge that such a sentence is appropriate. It 
will be in the offender’s interest to make submissions and provide information establishing that a conditional 
sentence is appropriate. 
11. The deference to which trial judges are entitled in imposing sentence generally applies to the decision whether or 
not to impose a conditional sentence. 
12. Conditional sentencing was enacted both to reduce reliance on incarceration as a sanction and to increase the 
principles of restorative justice in sentencing. 
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The key result of the Proulx decision, therefore, is that there is no presumption against the use of a conditional sentence if 
the crime does not have a mandatory period of incarceration. 
R v Wells70 
Another key decision of the Supreme Court concerned the role that conditional sentencing should play in relation to 
Aboriginal offenders. The case of R v Wells involved a sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment imposed on an Aboriginal man 
convicted of sexual assault. In upholding this sentence as appropriate in the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that 
the proper approach to considering a conditional sentence for an Aboriginal offender involves the following sequential 
considerations: 
 A preliminary consideration and exclusion of both a suspended sentence with probation and a penitentiary term of 
imprisonment as fit sentences; 
 Assessment of the seriousness of the particular offence with regard to its gravity, which necessarily includes the 
harm done, and the offender’s degree of responsibility; 
 Judicial notice of the “systemic or background factors that have contributed to the difficulties faced by aboriginal 
people in both the criminal justice system and throughout society at large”; and 
 An inquiry into the unique circumstances of the offender, including any evidence of community initiatives to use 
restorative justice principles in addressing particular social problems. 
While no offence is presumptively excluded from the possibility of a conditional sentence, as a practical matter, and 
notwithstanding s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, particularly violent and serious offences will result in imprisonment for 
Aboriginal offenders as often as for non-Aboriginal offenders. Although counsel and pre-sentence reports will be the primary 
source of information regarding the offender’s circumstances, there is a positive duty on the sentencing judge to inform 
himself or herself.71  In this case, the sentencing judge did properly inform himself. The application of subsection 718.2(e) 
does not mean that Aboriginal offenders must always be sentenced in a manner that gives greatest weight to the principles 
of restorative justice and less weight to goals such as deterrence, denunciation, and separation. The offence in this case 
was a serious one, so the principles of denunciation and deterrence led to the imposition of a term of imprisonment. 
R v Knoblauch72  
Mentally ill offenders are not excluded from access to conditional sentences. In the case of  
R v Knoblauch, an offender with a long history of mental illness was found to be in possession of a substantial arsenal 
capable of causing great harm to the public and damage to property. He pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of an 
explosive substance and to unlawful possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. In its decision, 
the Supreme Court upheld the imposition by the trial judge of a conditional sentence of two years less a day to be followed 
by three years of probation. The offender was required to spend the period of the conditional sentence in a secure 
psychiatric treatment unit, unless and until a consensus of psychiatric professionals made a decision to transfer him from 
the locked unit. 
The focus of the analysis in the Knoblauch case was on the risk posed by the individual offender while serving his sentence 
in the community. Danger to the community is evaluated by reference to the risk of re-offence and the gravity of the damage 
in the event of re-offence. While the gravity of the damage in this case could be extreme, the conditions imposed by the trial 
judge, including that the accused reside in a secure psychiatric facility, reduced the risk to a point that it was no greater than 
the risk that the accused would re-offend while incarcerated in a penal institution. Knoblauch expanded the scope of 
conditional sentences by using the new sanction to produce what is essentially confinement, albeit in a psychiatric facility 
rather than in a prison or penitentiary. 
In this case, the optional conditions that may be imposed as part of a conditional sentence order were used to assess an 
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offender’s dangerousness and reduce the threat of recidivism. This is in contrast to the optional conditions of a probation 
order that are directed towards “facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community.” 73  The 
appropriateness of confining the offender to a secure psychiatric facility flows from the intent of Parliament, in creating 
conditional sentences, to hold offenders accountable for offending while respecting the statutory purpose and principles of 
sentencing; this is to be done without subjecting the offender to penal confinement.74 The importance of Knoblauch may lie 
in the ability of courts to send more offenders to mental health facilities and not prisons. 
R v Fice 
In the case of R v Fice, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman who attacked her mother with a baseball bat and strangled 
her with a telephone cord should have been sent to prison rather than allowed to serve her sentence in the community. This 
case should serve to restrict the availability of conditional sentences across the country. Ms. Fice pleaded guilty to 
aggravated assault on her mother after the pair’s argument turned violent. She also pleaded guilty to fraud, personation, 
forgery and breach of recognizance. The Supreme Court held that the time Ms. Fice had spent in pre-trial custody was not a 
mitigating factor that can affect the range of sentence and, therefore, the availability of a conditional sentence. The Court 
held that, in considering whether to impose a conditional sentence, a court must first decide that a sentence of less than two 
years is appropriate. The conditional sentence regime was not designed for those offenders for whom a penitentiary term is 
appropriate. When a sentencing judge considers the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender 
and concludes that a sentence in the penitentiary range is warranted and that a conditional sentence is therefore 
unavailable, time spent in pre-sentence custody ought not to disturb this conclusion. 
R v F(GC)75  
The case of R v F(GC) is illustrative of the manner in which the Courts of Appeal in Canada have developed guidelines for 
the use of conditional sentencing by the lower courts. In this case, the accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual 
interference for his grooming of two 13-year-old girls to become sex objects. This eventually led to the offender having 
sexual intercourse with one of the complainants. The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of  
12 months. The Crown successfully appealed this sentence to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which varied it to one year in 
custody, after giving credit for the one-year sentence already served. In its reasons for decision, the Court of Appeal pointed 
out that it had repeatedly indicated that a conditional sentence should rarely be imposed in cases involving sexual assault of 
children, particularly where the accused was in a position of trust. Moreover, cases that involve multiple sexual activity over 
an extended period of time and escalating in obtrusiveness generally warrant a severe sentence. The trial judge had also 
failed to take into consideration the fundamental sentencing principle in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code that a sentence 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 
R v Bhalru; R v Khosa76  
The case of R v Bhalru; R v Khosa is an example of a Court of Appeal upholding a trial judge’s imposition of a conditional 
sentence in the face of a Crown appeal. Here, two individuals were convicted of criminal negligence causing death arising 
out of a street race in which they participated. In the course of the race, a pedestrian was struck and killed. The trial judge 
ordered the two drivers to serve conditional sentences of two years less a day, followed by probation for three years. The 
terms imposed as part of the conditional sentences included house arrest with limited exceptions and an order to perform 
240 hours of community work over a period of 18 months. A five-year driving prohibition was also imposed.  
The Crown argued that the sentences were unfit. This appeal was denied by the Court of Appeal. The Court followed the 
principles articulated in Proulx and the judicial recognition that conditional sentences may, in some circumstances, achieve 
general deterrence and denunciation in relation to driving offences; consequently, it concluded that the sentence was 
consistent with the sentencing principles and was not demonstrably unfit. The Court of Appeal also found that there was an 
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absence of aggravating factors beyond the street racing in this case; that finding, in addition to the strict nature of the 
conditional order that the trial judge fashioned, indicated that it was not unreasonable to order the two convicted persons to 
serve their sentence in the community. 
 
4. Singapore 
Conditional discharges and probation 
Singaporean courts are limited in their powers to suspend sentences imprisonment. They may 
do so only in cases where the imposition of the sentence has been held in abeyance after an 
offender’s conviction. There is no legal provision allowing Singaporean courts to suspend a 
sentence of imprisonment after it has been passed.
77
 Where the case falls within the ambit of 
court powers, that is, where it is a sentence in which the imposition has been held in 
abeyance, the court has the power to suspend the sentence by either ordering probation or a 
‘conditional discharge’. The ‘conditional discharge’ provision describes a mechanism by 
which an offender is discharged from the requirement to serve the sentence associated with 
the offence, provided he commits no offence during such period not exceeding 12 months 
from the date of the order. It is unique from the provisions in Hong Kong in several regards 
including the 12 month maximum prescribed period, the lack of attachment of any conditions 
aside from the prohibition on committing a further offence within the duration of the sentence, 
and the provision in section 11 which provides that any probation or discharge order made by 
the court will not be deemed a conviction for any other purpose than the proceedings in 
which the order is made.
78
 The statutory mechanism which provides for these offences is the 
Probation of Offenders Act (Cap 252, 1985, Rev Ed).  
Section 8(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act (POA) deals with ‘conditional discharge’ of 
offenders and provides as follows: 
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Where a court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence (not being an 
offence the sentence for which is fixed by law
79
) is of the opinion, having regard to 
the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, 
that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment and that a probation order is not appropriate, 
the court may make an order… discharging him subject to the condition that he 
commits no offence during such period, not exceeding 12 months from the date of the 
order, as may be specified therein.   
 
The provisions of the POA are limited to offenders who have attained the age of 16 but have 
not attained the age of 21 at the time of their conviction and who have not previously been 
convicted of an offence referred to in the proviso. The provisions regarding conditional 
discharge are considered less onerous than probation, as reflected in the chart below.  
Conditional discharges under section 8 and comparison with probation80 
 PROBATION CONDITIONAL 
DISCHARGE 
Triggering  
consideration 
Where a court by or before which a person is 
convicted of an offence (not being an offence the 
sentence for which is fixed by law) is of the 
opinion that having regard to the circumstances, 
including the nature of the offence and the 
character of the offender, it is expedient to do 
impose probation: section 5(1)POA. 
Where a court by or before 
which a person is convicted of 
an offence (not being an 
offence the sentence for which 
is fixed by law) is of the 
opinion that having regard to 
the circumstances, including the 
nature of the offence and the 
character of the offender, that it 
is inexpedient to inflict 
punishment and that a probation 
order is not appropriate, it may 
grant a conditional discharge: 
section 8(1) POA. 
Pre-sentence report As a matter of practice, courts call for a probation 
report before deciding whether to impose 
probation. 
No practice of calling for a pre-
sentence report before imposing 
conditional discharge. 
 
 PROBATION CONDITIONAL 
DISCHARGE 
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Supervision Offender is placed under the supervision of a 
probation officer or a volunteer probation officer: 
section 5(1). 
Offender is not placed under 
any form of supervision.  
Types of condition(s)/ 
requirements(s) 
“[S]uch requirements [as may be considered] 
necessary for securing the good conduct of the 
offender or for preventing a repetition by him of 
the same offence or the commission of other 
offences” –except a requirement to pay damages 
for injury or compensation for loss – within a 
prescribed period: section 5(2) POA.   
A probation order may include requirements 
relating to the offender’s residence: section 5(3). 
Offender must consent to the conditions of 
probation: section 5(4). 
Offender not to commit any 
offence within a prescribed 
period: section 8(1). 
 
Offender’s consent not 
required. 
Prescribed period Not less than six months nor more than three 
years: section 5(1). 
Not exceeding 12 months from 
the date of the order: section 
8(1). 
Power to discharge, 
amend and review 
conditions 
Power exists under section 6. No such power. 
In the event of a breach, the 
court may deal with the 
offender for the original offence 
without risk of double jeopardy: 
sections 7(2)(a) and 7(3)(b); 
sections 9(5) and 9(6) POA. 
Probation of Offenders (Amendment) Bill 1984 
From 1972 to 1978 the overall crime rate in Singapore generally fluctuated within the narrow 
range of between 900 and 800 offences per 100,000 population. In 1978, the crime rate was 
823 offences per 100,000 population, but by 1983 had reached 1,635 offences per 100,000 
citizens.
81
 In 1983, the Government response to this alarming rise in incidents of crime by 
proposing Amendments to the Probation of Offenders Bill to address the publicly perceived 
leniency of the penalties being handed to offenders, the failure of current sentencing 
provisions to sufficiently deter would be offenders, and the general distrust of the justice 
system by the public.  
In the Parliamentary debates concerning the Probation of Offenders, Parliament was asked to 
propose minimum mandatory sentences for six offences considered prevalent and lacking 
proportionality in terms of severity of sentence in relation to severity or potential fruits of the 
offence. These offences included all classes of robbery, housebreaking and theft, vehicle theft, 
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snatch theft, extortion, rape and outraging of modesty.  Recognising that the latter offence 
encompassed a range of activities, Clause 2 of the Bill introduced a new aggravated form of 
outraging modesty (‘Outraging modesty in certain circumstances’, section 354A) to cover 
cases in which hurt, wrongful restraint or fear is caused to the victim.  
In explaining the creation of the new offence of aggravated outrage of modesty, the Minister 
for Home Affairs, Mr Chua Sian Chin, explained, “The existing law does not differentiate the 
various degrees of severity of the acts involved in committing an outrage of modesty… It is 
thus necessary to introduce this section to cover a range of aggravated instances of outraging 
of modesty.” The result of the addition of this provision is that the original provision, section 
354 ‘Assault or use of criminal force to a person with intent to outrage modesty’, could 
attract a suspended sentence or probation for offenders meeting the requisites of the POA 
generally, as it is not an offence which has a mandatory minimum sentence as in the case 
where aggravating factors are present.
82
   
Offence not being an offence the sentence for which is ‘fixed by law’ 
Prior to the decision in Juma’at bin Samad v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 SLR 338 (Samad), 
the High Court approached the question as to what amounted to a sentence ‘fixed by law’ as 
one which was fixed both in quantum and in kind. In Samad, however, the court departed 
from this approach, with Yong Pung How CJ reasoning that the expression was merely 
indicative of the fact that the court’s discretion to make a probation order is subordinated to 
the power of legislature to provide that certain offenders suffer certain forms of punishment. 
He explained: 
The provision of a mandatory minimum sentence is a clear instance of the exercise of 
this power by the legislature and the court ought not to usurp this power by an 
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 (1) Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending to outrage or knowing it to be 
likely that he will thereby outrage the modesty of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment 
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unjustifiably wide reading of an unambiguous provision. Therefore the expression ‘an 
offence (not being an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law) cannot and 
should not be given the excessively broad meaning of any offence other than the one 
which attracts a single inflexible sentence for which the exact quantum and kind of 
punishment are expressly provided in the statutory provision concerned. 
 
It was held that where an offence under the Penal Code prescribes a mandatory minimum 
sentence, it is compulsory for the court to impose a particular type of punishment (custodial) 
and further to ensure that the quantum of such punishment complies with the minimum levels 
expressly stipulated by Parliament.
83
  
Legislative amendments in 199384 
In response to the decision in Samar, in 1993 Parliament moved legislative amendments to 
enhance judicial discretion to apply the PAO to offences where a mandatory minimum 
sentence is prescribed for that offence. Members noted that 94% of young offenders on 
probation were first time offenders and that of these, approximately 84% completed it 
successfully. It was noted that the primary objective of sentencing young offenders was 
rehabilitative rather than deterrence or retribution, save in the gravest cases. Probation 
enabled young offenders to continue in their employment or studies and to benefit from the 
personal care, guidance and supervision of a Probation Officer and to complete the 
requirements with the knowledge that no conviction would stand on their permanent record. 
The courts, in exercising their discretion to sentence offenders under the PAO would have 
regard to a myriad of factors, including, the offender’s prospects of reform and rehabilitation, 
the seriousness of the offence, reasons mitigating against granting probation, the offender’s 
age and home environment, and the offfender’s character and sense of remorse. Offenders 
who committed serious offences would continue to be exempt from sentences available under 
the PAO, as would those with prior antecedents.  
The assessment of the gravity of the offence would include the court’s consideration of: i) the 
nature of the offence; ii) the effects of the offence; iii) the offender’s reason and motivation 
for committing the offence; iv) the circumstances of the offence; and v) policy considerations. 
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 Offences which the courts have indicated as inappropriate for PAO sentencing options 
include robbery or other violent crimes, rape, drug offences, and offences under the 
Computer Misuse Act. 
 
5. United Kingdom 
Suspended sentences before 2012 
Prior to 1 May 2012, suspended sentences in the UK were governed by sections 189 to 191 of 
the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003.
86
 As is the case in Hong Kong, these sentences 
counted as custodial sentences, and were thus appropriate only for cases where imprisonment 
was the only option. But unlike Hong Kong, there were no excepted offences to the power. 
Custodial terms for any offence that attracted a sentence of up to 12 months in the Crown 
Courts, or six months in the Magistrates Courts could be suspended. The sentence of 
imprisonment would not take effect unless either (i) during the ‘supervision period’ the 
offender fails to comply with a requirement under the order, or (ii) during the ‘operational 
period’ the offender commits another offence (whether or not punishable with a custodial 
sentence): section 189(1)(b). 
The court was to specify both an ‘operational period’, the time for which the sentence is 
suspended and a ‘supervision period’, the time during which the offender has to comply with 
community sentence requirements when it passes a suspended sentence. Section 189(3) of the 
CJA provided that both the supervision period and the operation period must run from six 
months to two years, and that the supervision period could not run longer than the operation 
period.  
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Section 190 detailed the types of additional requirements which offenders might be required 
to comply with, including: 
a) an unpaid work requirement; 
b) an activity requirement; 
c) a programme requirement; 
d) a prohibited activity requirement; 
e) a curfew requirement; 
f) an exclusion requirement; 
g) a residence requirement; 
h) a mental health treatment requirement; 
i) a drug rehabilitation requirement; 
j) an alcohol treatment requirement; 
k) a supervision requirement; or 
l) in a case where the offender is less than 25 years of age, an attendance center 
requirement.  
Breaking the Cycle: The findings of the 2010 Ministry of Justice report on effective 
punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of offenders87 
In December 2010, the UK Ministry of Justice published a green paper on Criminal Justice 
Reform. Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of 
Offenders (the ‘Green Paper’) set out plans for fundamental changes to the UK criminal 
justice system.  The Foreword to the Green Paper described the function of the UK justice 
system at the time as “an expensive way of giving the public a break from offenders, before 
they return to commit more crimes.” It was noted that despite a 50% increase in the previous 
ten years in the budget for prisons and management of offenders, almost half of all adults 
released from custody went on to reoffend within one year. The call was thus made for an 
intelligent sentencing framework, which, coupled with more effective rehabilitation would 
break the cycle of crime and prison. In addition to measures designed to make the 
administration of punishment more robust and efficient, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Bill 2010-2011 (‘the Bill’) would make it an express duty of the 
court (rather than the current power) to consider making compensation orders where victims 
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have suffered harm or loss. The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 21 June 
2011 and received Royal Assent on 1 May 2012. 
88
 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 201289 
Changes to the provisions on suspension of sentences are outlined in ss 68 and 69 of Part 3 of 
the Act. Having noted the utility of the power to suspend sentences where the threat of 
custody would be sufficient to incentivize an offender to reform, s 68 of the Act empowered 
the courts to suspend a sentence for a custodial period for a period of 24 months, representing 
a 12 month increase on the powers conferred in the 2003 Act.  The courts were also given a 
new choice as to whether or not to impose community requirements. This choice was 
afforded so that it would give the courts more discretion to make best use of suspended 
sentences, and to target resources spent on community requirements on those who would 
most benefit from them in respect of punishment and rehabilitation. 
The community requirements the court is empowered to impose on an individual upon whom 
a suspended sentence of imprisonment is passed are detailed in ss 70-77 of the Act and 
include programme requirements, curfew requirements, foreign travel prohibition 
requirements, mental health treatment requirements, drug rehabilitation requirements, alcohol 
treatment requirements, and alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement.  
Under the provisions of s 69 of the Act, the courts now have the option of fining offenders 
who breach the terms of their suspended sentence.
90
 The fine may be imposed while allowing 
the original order to continue, giving courts more options when dealing with offenders who 
have breached conditions of suspended sentences.  
The ‘no real prospect’ test 
In addition to the substantial reforms surrounding suspended custodial sentences, the Act also 
makes changes to the law on bail and remand, aimed at reducing the number of those who are 
unnecessarily remanded into custody. Under the new “no real prospect” test, the court would 
assess the reasonable probability that the offence is imprisonable as a criterion of whether the 
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court could deny bail. If it is unlikely that the offence committed would attract a custodial 
sentence, bail would be granted. The provision is intended to remedy the misuse of custodial 
remand, where such remand would be considered unnecessary or unjust.  
In welcoming the establishment of the ‘no real prospect’ test, the Prison Reform Trust noted 
in an October 2011 report,
91
 that over 55,000 people, representing more than half of all first-
time receptions to custody were remanded to prison each year in the UK to await trial.
92
 Such 
pretrial detention, on charges which would not lead to a custodial sentence is potentially 
disproportionate, damaging and wasteful of public funds. Importantly, the test would not 
restrict custodial remand for serious offences such as murder, manslaughter or rape, nor 
where there is any risk that the person will engage in domestic violence if released on bail. 
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